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Paying for Risk:  
Bankers, Compensation, and Competition 
 
By Simone M. Sepe+ and Charles K. Whitehead 
 
 
 
Efforts to control bank risk address the wrong problem in the wrong way.  
They presume that the financial crisis was caused by CEOs who failed to super-
vise risk-taking employees.  The responses focus on executive pay, believing that 
executives will bring non-executives into line—using incentives to manage risk-
taking—once their own pay is regulated.  What they overlook is the effect on non-
executive pay of the competition for talent.  Even if executive pay is regulated, 
and executives act in the bank’s best interests, they will still be trapped into 
providing incentives that encourage risk-taking by non-executives due to the 
negative externality that arises from that competition.  
  
 Greater risk-taking can increase short-term profits and, in turn, the 
amount a non-executive receives, potentially at the expense of long-term bank 
value.  Non-executives, therefore, have an incentive to incur significant risk 
upfront so long as they can depart for a new employer before any losses 
materialize.  The result is an upward spiral in compensation—reducing an execu-
tive’s ability to set non-executive pay and the ability of any one bank to adjust 
compensation to reflect risk-taking and long-term outcomes.   
   
New regulation must address the tension between compensation and 
competition.  Regulators should take account of the effect of competition on 
market-wide levels of pay, including by non-banks who compete for talent.  The 
ability of non-executives to jump from a bank employer to another financial firm 
should also be limited.  In addition, banks should be required to include a long-
term equity component in non-executive pay, with subsequent employers being 
restricted from compensating a new employee for any losses she incurs related to 
her prior work. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Nick Leeson, a mid-level futures trader, was not yet 30 years old in 1995 when he 
incurred the $1.3 billion in losses that blew up Barings Bank.  In 1992, when Leeson’s 
trading profits were ten percent of Barings’ annual income, he earned a bonus of 
£130,000 on a salary of £50,000.1  Fabrice Tourre, then a 29-year-old vice president, was 
charged with fraud in Goldman Sachs’ 2007 sale of its Abacus subprime collateralized 
                                                 
+
 Associate Professor of Law, James E. Rogers College of Law, University of Arizona; Institute for 
Advanced Study in Toulouse – Fondation Jean-Jacques Laffont – Toulouse School of Economics. 

 Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.  We appreciate the thoughtful comments and contributions of 
Ian Ayres, Doug Baird, Patrick Bolton, Bob Cooter, Jacques Crémér, Michael Frakes, Jeff Gordon, Eugene 
Gregor, Henry Hansmann, Michael Heise, Dan Klerman, Don Langevoort, Tom Lin, Saura Masconale, 
Ugo Pagano, Bob Rasmussen. Alan Schwartz, Eric Talley, Jean Tirole, Mark Underberg, and participants 
in the Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse Conference on New Advances in Law and Economics, the 
Goethe-Universität Frankfurt, Program in Law and Economics of Money and Finance Lecture Series, the 
SIDE–ISLE 2013 9th Annual Conference, and the William and Mary Law School Seminar Series.  We also 
appreciate the valuable research assistance provided by Eric DiMuzio and Margaret Schmidt.  All errors 
and omissions are the authors’ alone. 
1
 See Mark Roodhouse, Leeson, Nick, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WHITE-COLLAR & CORPORATE CRIME 
493, 493 (Lawrence M. Salinger ed., 2005); see also How Leeson Broke the Bank, BBC NEWS (June 22, 
1999), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/375259.stm. 
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debt obligations.  Tourre’s compensation that year, well before the start of the fraud 
investigation, was $2 million.2  Bruno Iksil, nicknamed the “London Whale” for the size 
of his trading portfolio, was a JPMorgan proprietary trader in his late 30’s who realized 
losses of up to $6.2 billion in 2012.3  Iksil’s total compensation was $7.32 million in 
2010 and $6.76 million in 2011.4 
 
All three—Leeson, Tourre, and Iksil—share common characteristics:  None was a 
bank executive.  Each had the authority (real or apparent) to engage in significant busi-
ness activities on their employer’s behalf.  And the risks they incurred profited their 
employers in the short-term—eventually causing losses or lawsuits, but only after each 
was paid handsomely.    
 
Why, then, in the wake of the financial crisis, has executive compensation been a 
principal focus of efforts to control bank risk?5  Although bank supervisors have provided 
new guidance on non-executive pay,6 the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP)7 
requires banks that received government aid during the financial crisis to modify only 
how senior executives and top earners are paid.8  The new “say-on-pay” rules also give 
shareholders a non-binding vote on compensation, but again, only on executive pay.9  
                                                 
2
 See Steven M. Davidoff & Peter J. Henning, The Importance of Fabrice Tourre, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
20, 2010), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/04/20/the-importance-of-fabrice-tourre/. 
3
 See Shannon D. Harrington et al., JPMorgan Trader Iksil Fuels Prop-Trading Debate with Bets, 
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 9, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-09/jpmorgan-trader-iksil-fuels-
prop-trading-debate-with-bets.html; Jessica Silver-Greenberg, JPMorgan Sues Boss of ‘London Whale’ in 
Trading Loss, N.Y. TIMES, (Oct. 31, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/10/31/jpmorgan-sues-boss-
of-london-whale/. 
4
 See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. AND 
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 113TH CONG., JPMORGAN CHASE WHALE TRADES: A CASE HISTORY OF 
DERIVATIVES RISKS AND ABUSES 58 (Comm. Print 2013) [hereinafter U.S. SENATE REPORT].  
5
 Prior to the financial crisis, the Federal Deposit Insurance Improvement Act of 1991 required the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Reserve Board (Fed), the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) to prescribe standards that 
would regulate compensation generally.  See Pub. L. No. 102-242, sec. 132, § 39(c), 105 Stat. 2236, 2268   
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831p-1(c) (2012)); Standards for Safety and Soundness, 60 Fed. Reg. 35674, 
35674, 35678 (July 10, 1995).  Those agencies adopted guidelines prohibiting “excessive compensation”—
compensation that is “unreasonable or disproportionate to the services performed by an executive officer, 
employee, director, or principal shareholder”—and any compensation that “could lead to material financial 
loss.”  12 C.F.R. pt. 30, app. A (2013) (OCC); pt. 208, app. D-1 (Fed); pt. 364, app. A (FDIC); pt. 570, app. 
A (OTS). 
6
 See Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 75 Fed. Reg. 36,395 (June 25, 2010) [here-
inafter Compensation Guidance].  A summary description of the Compensation Guidance appears in 
Appendix A.   
7
 See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5211-5241 (2012).  TARP’s 
implementing rules are set out at 31 C.F.R. pt. 30 (2013). 
8
 See 12 U.S.C. § 5221 (2012).   
9
 See 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-21 (2013).  Academics have also focused 
primarily on executive pay.  See, e.g., PATRICK BOLTON ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., EXECUTIVE 
COMPENSATION AND RISK TAKING (2010), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/ 
sr456.pdf (studying the connection between risk-taking and executive compensation in financial 
institutions, and providing an empirical analysis of market perceptions of debt-like compensation); Lucian 
A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247, 249 (2010) (identifying 
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The focus on executive pay addresses the wrong problem in the wrong way.  It 
presumes that the problem with excessive bank risk prior to the 2007 financial crisis was 
internal—that bank CEOs failed to supervise employees who pursued risky strategies.  
Fixing executive pay has been the response, with the expectation that executives will 
bring non-executives10 into line—using incentives to manage risk-taking—once execu-
tive pay is regulated.11  Yet, as this Article describes, it was non-executive incentives that 
significantly affected bank risk-taking prior to the 2007 financial crisis; and the structure, 
as well as the level, of those incentives was determined largely by the market’s demand 
for talent, independent of executive pay.12  In particular, what the current focus misses is 
                                                                                                                                                 
incentives for risk-taking embedded in executive compensation); Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, 
Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing and Committing to the Long-Term, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 359, 
361 (2009) (suggesting an executive incentive compensation plan consisting only of restricted stock and 
restricted stock options in order to manage the firm in the long-term interests of shareholders); Robert 
DeYoung et al., Executive Compensation and Business Policy Choices at U.S. Commercial Banks, 48 J. 
FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 165 (finding evidence that bank CEO incentives encouraged risk-taking); 
Simone M. Sepe, Making Sense of Executive Compensation, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 189, 196-207 (2011) 
(noting that fixed compensation schemes may be desirable to efficiently control the risk-taking incentives 
of executives); David I. Walker, Evolving Executive Equity Compensation and the Limits of Optimal 
Contracting, 64 VAND. L. REV. 609 (2011) (considering the evolution in executive equity pay practices and 
examining the limitations on efficient compensation contracting); Ing-Haw Cheng et al., Yesterday’s 
Heroes: Compensation and Creative Risk-Taking 2-5 (European Corporate Governance Inst., Working 
Paper No. 285, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1502762 (presenting evidence linking top-
management compensation and risk at financial firms during 1992-2008); Marc Chesney et al., Managerial 
Incentives to Take Asset Risk 4-5 (Swiss Fin. Inst., Working Paper No. 10-18, 2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1595343 (finding that CEO incentives promoted risk-taking by banks prior to the 
financial crisis).  Some have argued that excessive compensation—at least with respect to CEOs and other 
senior executives—was not a likely cause of bank risk prior to the financial crisis.  See Rüdiger 
Fahlenbrach & René M. Stulz, Bank CEO Incentives and the Credit Crisis, 99 J. FIN. ECON. 11, 12-13 
(2011); see also Francesco Vallascas & Jens Hagendorff, CEO Bonus Compensation and Bank Default 
Risk: Evidence from the U.S. and Europe, 22 FIN. MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS & INSTRUMENTS 47, 47 (2013) 
(finding that increases in CEO cash bonuses lower a bank’s default risk, except when the bank is 
financially distressed or operating within a weak regulatory regime). 
10
 References in this Article to a bank’s “non-executives” are to employees who are not senior, top-
ranking members of the bank’s management. 
11
 See, e.g., Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 9, at 281 (“Compensation structures shape the incentives 
of those actually making the decisions on behalf of banks, namely bank executives.”); John Thanassoulis, 
The Case for Intervening in Bankers’ Pay, 67 J. FIN. 849, 850 (2012) (“Individual bankers work under a 
risk control regime overseen by the CEO and the board of directors.  Those senior executives can control 
bank risk through their policies on hedging, diversification, and asset allocation.  Financial regulation exists 
to make sure that CEOs and boards properly exercise their duties to build structures allowing them to 
manage the risks taken by their employees.”).  
12
 See infra notes 126-129 and accompanying text.  A handful of recent studies have begun to consider 
the effect of non-executive compensation on bank risk.  See, e.g., Christina E. Bannier et al., Competition, 
Bonuses, and Risk-taking in the Banking Industry, 17 REV. FIN. 653, 653-54 (2013) (focusing on the bonus 
component of non-executive compensation); Eric D. Chason, The Uneasy Case for Deferring Banker Pay, 
73 LA. L. REV. 923, 927, 962-74 (2013) (criticizing proposals for the use of debt-based compensation to 
remunerate bankers); Robert J. Jackson, Stock Unloading and Banker Incentives, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 951, 
953, 956-60 (2012) (analyzing the effect of the unloading of stock-based compensation attributed to non-
executives); Thanassoulis, supra note 11, at 849 (claiming that competition for bank employees generates a 
negative externality by increasing compensation and rival banks’ default risk); Viral Acharya et al., Non-
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the effect on compensation of the competition among financial firms to hire non-execu-
tives.  That effect is significant.  In a competitive market, firms are expected to adjust 
compensation in line with market demand, assessing and paying employees based on 
their relative ability to generate returns.  In principle, that competition should align 
employee and employer incentives, allocating the best employees to the most profitable 
firms.13  Among banks, however, combining performance-based pay with competition—
where employees can move from one employer to the next—has had perverse results.  
Greater risk-taking can increase short-term14  bank profits and, in turn, the amount a non-
executive is paid, potentially at the expense of long-term bank value.15  Non-executives, 
therefore, have an incentive to incur significant risk upfront so long as they can depart for 
a new employer before any longer-term losses (and corresponding drop in pay) 
materialize.16   
 
 For the non-executive, taking on greater risk becomes a win-win strategy.  On the 
one hand, the non-executive is rewarded with higher pay due to her greater short-term 
performance, since employers are unable to assess (and discount) her risk-adjusted 
results.17  On the other hand, the consequences of the non-executive’s risk-taking are 
minimized, because greater performance, and the mobility that comes with it, permit her 
to change jobs and sidestep losses that arise in the future.18  In short, efforts to hire the 
best talent have produced a negative externality:  Compensation is the product of each 
bank’s demand for the same employees, and since hiring is based on short-term perfor-
mance, greater risk-taking is rewarded without accounting for potential longer-term 
losses.  Competition results in an upward spiral in pay and limits the banks’ ability to 
efficiently adjust compensation to reflect risk-taking and long-term outcomes.19  Stated 
                                                                                                                                                 
Executive Incentives and Bank Risk-Taking (Wharton Fin. Institutions Ctr., Working Paper No. 13-18, 
2013), available at http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/13/13-18.pdf (demonstrating that incentives 
paid to bank non-executives in 2003-2006 were mainly driven by market factors and were related to higher 
bank risk and lower bank value during the financial crisis) [hereinafter Acharya et al., Non-Executive 
Incentives]; Viral V. Acharya et al., Seeking Alpha: Excess Risk Taking and Competition for Managerial 
Talent (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18891, 2013), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w18891 (developing a theoretical model to analyze the negative externality 
created by bank competition for non-executive talent) [hereinafter Acharya et al., Seeking Alpha].  
13
 See infra notes 42, 80 and accompanying text.  
14
 We refer to “short-term” and “long-term” periods (and similar phrases) throughout this Article.  Our 
purpose is only to signify successive periods over which employees perform or are paid, without 
identifying particular lengths of time.   
15
 See infra notes 83-84 and accompanying text. 
16
 Although banking has evolved, see infra Part I.A., a portion of a bank’s losses may not be realized 
until the long-term due to its investment in illiquid assets with maturities that are longer than a bank’s 
demand deposits.  See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Deposit Insurance, the Implicit Regulatory 
Contract, and the Mismatch in the Term Structure of Banks’ Assets and Liabilities, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 7 
(1995). 
17
 See infra notes 81, 95 and accompanying text. 
18
 See infra notes 53, 95, 100-101 and accompanying text. 
19
 See infra notes 92-95, 100-101 and accompanying text; see also Bannier et al., supra note 12, at 655, 
679.  As the Financial Times described it, 
 
Banks operate in a world where their star talent is apt to jump between different groups, 
whenever a bigger pay-packet appears, with scant regard for corporate loyalty or employment 
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differently, even if executive pay is regulated, and executives act in the bank’s best 
interests, they will still be trapped into providing risk-prone incentives to non-executives 
due to the negative externality that arises from the competition for talent.20   
 
In this account of compensation and competition, banks face an informational and 
a coordination problem.  The informational problem arises from a bank’s inability to 
assess an employee’s risk-adjusted results unless she remains employed long enough for 
the full consequences of her strategy to materialize.21  The coordination problem arises 
from each bank’s efforts to hire the same non-executives.  Each bank has a legitimate 
interest in luring the best performers, but in doing so, it rewards employees who may 
choose to enhance short-term performance at the expense of increased risk-taking and 
longer-term losses.22  
 
We argue for three regulatory changes to address these problems.  First, reflecting 
change in the financial markets, regulators should extend their assessment of compensa-
tion beyond individual banks to include the effect of competition on market-wide levels 
of pay, including the broader range of employers who now compete with banks for 
talent.23  Second, certain of a bank’s non-executives should be restricted from moving to 
other financial employers (including banks, insurance companies, broker-dealers, and 
hedge funds) for a period of time after leaving the bank, subject to defined exceptions.  A 
mandatory “garden leave” period24 will increase the cost of departure, as well as permit 
successor employers to better assess a prospective hire’s performance, helping to balance 
                                                                                                                                                 
contracts.  The result is that the compensation committees of many banks feel utterly trapped. . . .  
[A]s [one senior financial executive] says: “These bonuses are crazy—we all know that.  But we 
don’t know how to stop paying them without losing our best staff.” 
 
Gillian Tett, What Bankers Can Learn from Chelsea Football Club, FIN. TIMES ASIA EDITION 1 (London), 
Sept. 11, 2009, at 20, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/03988992-9e6a-11de-b0aa00144feabdc0. 
html#axzz2RFNvwcoC.  The Treasury Department, the Fed, and the FDIC also noted the effect of compen-
sation on bank risk prior to the financial crisis:  “Flawed incentive compensation practices in the financial 
industry were one of many factors contributing to the financial crisis that began in 2007.  Banking 
organizations too often rewarded employees for increasing the organization’s revenue or short-term profit 
without adequate recognition of the risks the employees’ activities posed to the organization.”  Compen-
sation Guidance, supra note 6, at 36,396; accord FINANCIAL STABILITY FORUM, FSF PRINCIPLES FOR 
SOUND COMPENSATION PRACTICES 1 (2009), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/ 
publications/r_0904b.pdf (describing consistent principles; the Financial Stability Forum was renamed the 
Financial Stability Board in April 2009) [hereinafter FSF PRINCIPLES].  
20
 See infra note 162 and accompanying text. 
21
 See infra notes 81-82, 95, 146 and accompanying text. 
22
 See infra notes 83-84, 96, 147 and accompanying text. 
23
 See infra Part III.A. 
24
 “Garden leave” is a U.K.-originated employment practice that has become increasingly common in 
the United States, often as a substitute for a contractual covenant not to compete.  Under a garden leave 
provision, an employee is required to give her employer advance notice of her intention to depart, but must 
serve out a period of time at home (or “in the garden”) before starting a new job.  The employee receives 
all salary and benefits (but not bonus) during the period.  See Timothy J. Perri, Garden Leave vs. Covenants 
Not to Compete, 6 REV. L. & ECON. 167, 167-68 (2010); Jeffrey S. Klein & Nichols J. Pappas, ‘Garden 
Leave’ Clauses in Lieu of Non-Competes, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 5, 2009, at 3. 
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against a non-executive’s incentives for short-term risk-taking.25  Third, banks should be 
required to include a long-term equity component in non-executive pay, with subsequent 
employers being restricted from compensating a new employee for any losses she incurs 
related to her prior work.26   
 
To be clear, our goal is not to try to set an optimal, one-size-fits-all pay structure.  
Banks are diverse, suggesting that compensation—to be effective in helping manage 
risk—must take account of the circumstances of each individual firm.27  Rather, we 
argue, an approach to regulating pay that focuses on individual banks without also taking 
account of the market-wide competition for talent will fail to address the risk-taking 
incentives that arose prior to the financial crisis.  That competition will continue to distort 
individual efforts to craft compensation that aims to manage risk.28 
 
We lay out our basic claim in Part I—namely, that non-executive pay in the finan-
cial markets is largely set by the competitive demand for talent, leading to an overall 
increase in pay and distortion in risk incentives for non-executives.  Part II provides 
empirical support for our claim, setting out findings based on a model developed for a 
recent empirical study of bank non-executive compensation co-authored by one of us.29  
Those findings deliver two major results.  First, they show that bank non-executive pay 
before the financial crisis (2003-2006) was tied largely to short-term bank performance, 
contributing to the increased bank risk and reduced bank value that occurred during the 
financial crisis (2007-2009).  Second, they demonstrate the impact of market factors on 
non-executive incentives and, in turn, on bank risk and bank value.  Finally, in Part III, 
we propose new regulation to address competition’s effects on compensation and the 
problems this Article identifies.  We also discuss the value of a mandatory compensation 
cap that is more robust than the measure proposed in the European Union.30   
 
I.   COMPENSATION AND COMPETITION 
 
 Competition is the key to efficiency in the neoclassical economic model.31  
Assuming perfect information, competition ensures that individuals and firms are led, 
almost as if by an invisible hand,32 to allocate resources optimally.33  Since information is 
                                                 
25
 See infra Part III.B.   
26
 See infra Part III.C.   
27
 See Compensation Guidance, supra note 6, at 36,397. 
28
 See infra notes 95-96, 100-101 and accompanying text. 
29
 See Acharya et al., Non-Executive Incentives, supra note 12.  
30
 See infra notes 174-182 and accompanying text. 
31
 See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, WHITHER SOCIALISM? 45 (1994). 
32
 In his seminal work, Adam Smith characterized the virtues of a free-market economy where 
individuals selfishly interact among themselves, but together advance the public interest as if led by an 
invisible hand.  See ADAM SMITH, 2 THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 273 (James Decker 1801). 
33
 The analytical characterization of Smith’s “invisible hand” is represented by the First Welfare 
Theorem (also known as the Arrow-Debreu model), which states that a competitive equilibrium (the equili-
brium that arises when consumers maximize their utility and firms maximize their profits) is, under certain 
assumptions, Pareto optimal.  See Kenneth J. Arrow & Gerard Debreu, Existence of an Equilibrium for a 
Competitive Economy, 22 ECONOMETRICA 265, 265-66 (1954); see also ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., 
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complete, no employee has an interest in misbehaving—employers can observe whether 
or not the employee benefits the firm, making it irrational for her to act opportunis-
tically.34  Compensation is less important, since competition and perfect information lead 
to an optimal outcome without the need for incentives.35   
 
Incentives matter, however, once we begin to relax the model’s idealized assump-
tions.36  That explains why incentive theory—based on the standard principal-agent 
model of the firm37—has gained so much influence in modern economics.38  A starting 
point of that theory is the recognition that informational asymmetries arise when labor is 
divided between principals (employers) and agents (employees).  The agent develops 
private information, which can be of two types:  she may have hidden knowledge of her 
own characteristics or value, a problem known as “adverse selection;”39 or she may take 
hidden actions, a problem known as “moral hazard.”40  A primary concern is that the 
employee may choose to exploit this informational asymmetry to her own advantage, 
potentially at the employer’s expense.41  Incentive theory relies on compensation to assist 
                                                                                                                                                 
MICROECONOMIC THEORY 549-50 (1995) (discussing the First Welfare Theorem in the context of general 
equilibrium theory). 
34
 See Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J. ECON. 74, 74 (1979).  
35
 See STIGLITZ, supra note 31, at 66 (“Incentives . . . play no role in the standard neoclassical theory.”) 
36
 See id. at 66-68.  Bruce Greenwald and Joseph Stiglitz demonstrated that the results of the Arrow-
Debreu model are no longer valid when the idealized assumptions of perfect information are dropped.  See 
Bruce C. Greenwald & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Externalities in Economies with Imperfect Information and 
Incomplete Markets, 101 Q. J. ECON. 229, 231-38 (1986). 
37
 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308-10 (1976). 
38
 See generally JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & DAVID MARTIMORT, THE THEORY OF INCENTIVES: THE 
PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL 11-15 (2002) (providing a systematic treatment of incentive theory). 
39
 George Akerlof received the Nobel Prize in Economics for his classic account of adverse selection in 
the products market.  Under conditions of uncertainty, a seller does not know how much a buyer is willing 
to pay for a good, in other words, whether the buyer’s type is “good” or “bad.”  See George A. Akerlof, The 
Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488, 490 (1970).  
Akerlof shows that, when the number of bad buyers is relatively high, sellers may prefer to stop exchanging 
goods, leading to a market breakdown.  See id.  Other examples of adverse selection include (i) when a firm 
hires a worker and does not know the worker’s ability, see Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q. J. 
ECON. 355, 356 (1973), and (ii) when an insurance company insures a car and the driver has private 
information about her risk propensity, see Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz Equilibrium in Competitive 
Insurance Markets: An Essay in the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q. J. ECON. 629, 630-32 
(1976).   
40
 See LAFFONT & MARTIMORT, supra note 38, at 145 (“By the mere fact of delegation, the principal 
often loses any ability to control those actions [of the agent] that are no longer observable.”)  Moral hazard 
involves an agent’s suboptimal “effort choices” and “risk choices.”  See Martin Hellwig, A Reconsideration 
of the Jensen-Meckling Model of Outside Finance, 18 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 495, 496 (2009) (referring to 
this problem as “two-dimensional moral hazard”).  Effort choices involve the choice by the agent of a given 
level of effort that affects her performance.  See PATRICK BOLTON & MATHIAS DEWATRIPONT, CONTRACT 
THEORY 129 (2005).  Moral hazard arises because effort is costly to the agent, who may have incentives to 
act sub-optimally.  Risk choices involve moral hazard when an agent chooses a given level of risk on behalf 
of the principal, but where she may have incentives to engage in excessive or insufficient risk-taking.  See 
Bruno Biais & Catherine Casamatta, Optimal Leverage and Aggregate Investment, 54 J. FIN. 1291, 1293 
(1999).  
41
 See LAFFONT & MARTIMORT, supra note 38, at 11-12.  Screening and monitoring can reduce the 
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in aligning the agent’s and the principal’s interests.42  Competition is also important but 
not as central, providing a means to benchmark performance and adjust compensation.43   
 
Incentive theory is often framed within a “bilateral agency” relationship, which 
assumes that principals do not compete with other principals, and agents do not compete 
with other agents.44  That is the model underlying the regulation of executive pay—focus-
ing on the relationship between employers and employees, without taking account of the 
competition among employers.45  But what happens when principals begin to compete?  
Relationships in a competitive world are explored within a “common agency” model, 
which considers what can occur when principals with conflicting interests compete for 
the services of a common agent (the employee).46  Competition induces each employer to 
offer the employee a compensation contract that makes the other contracts less appeal-
ing.47  The employee can use that competition to her advantage by negotiating for greater 
pay through the threat of accepting a competitor’s offer.48  Anticipating her competitors’ 
interest, the first employer is induced to enhance the compensation contract she originally 
offers.49  The result is an inefficient escalation in employee pay50 that undercuts the 
ability of any one employer to design an efficient compensation contract.51 
 
The common agency model informs our analysis of bank non-executive compen-
sation.  As we describe below, in a competitive market, each bank naturally pursues the 
                                                                                                                                                 
amount of private information.  Through screening, the principal can cause the agent to reveal private 
information by providing her with a menu of choices; which choice the agent selects reveals private 
information about the agent.  See Rothschild & Stiglitz, supra note 39, at 639, 643.  Through monitoring, 
the principal can collect and process information about the agent and her behavior.  See JEAN TIROLE, THE 
THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 334-35 (2006).  
42
 Under incentive theory, compensation contracts essentially are designed to elicit private information 
by paying the agent an amount equal to what she would have received if she behaved opportunistically.  
The contract must also induce the agent to voluntarily enter into the contractual relationship by rewarding 
her an amount at least equal to the value to her of not entering into the contract.  For an analytical 
description, see LAFFONT & MARTIMORT, supra note 38, at 36-37.  
43
 See STIGLITZ, supra note 31, at 111-12.   
44
 See LAFFONT & MARTIMORT, supra note 38, at 38. 
45
 See supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text. 
46
 The seminal work on common agency is B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, Common 
Agency, 54 ECONOMETRICA 923 (1986).  For a survey of common agency studies, see David Martimort, 
Multi-Contracting Mechanism Design, in 1 ADVANCES IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS 57 (Richard 
Blundell et al. eds., 2006) (highlighting the crucial importance of coordination among principals).  For a 
discussion of common agency in the context of corporations, see Simone M. Sepe, Corporate Agency 
Problems and Dequity Contracts, 36 J. CORP. L. 113, 128-33 (2010). 
47
 See Bernheim & Winston, supra note 46, at 927-30.  
48
 For example, when principals compete on the basis of price, the agent can exploit that competition 
and extract additional rents.  See MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 33, at 388-89. 
49
 See Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts, 58 
ECONOMETRICA 1279, 1279-82, 1307-08 (1990). 
50
 See STIGLITZ, supra note 31, at 114 (observing that in some contexts, including the managerial labor 
market, “competition does not serve social goals: Resources get dissipated in the competition for rents.”).   
51
 See Ilya Segal & Michael D. Whinston, Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting With 
Externalities, 71 ECONOMETRICA 757, 758-59 (2003).   
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same employees based on their short-term performance.52  Consistent with the common 
agency model, greater competition results in an upward spiral in pay and limits the 
banks’ ability to efficiently adjust compensation to reflect risk-taking and long-term 
outcomes.  Riskier strategies and heightened performance improve an employee’s com-
pensation and, by making her more attractive to competitors, permit her to jump to a new 
job and sidestep the losses that later result.53  In aggregate, this has permitted non-execu-
tives to take on excessive risk in the short-term without facing the longer-term conse-
quences of their risk-taking.54   
 
Next, in Section A, we describe the industry setting within which bank non-exe-
cutive compensation has evolved.  Changes in the financial markets caused market parti-
cipants increasingly to compete for the same business with the same customers.  That 
change fueled an increase in the competition for talent, with compensation levels 
escalating in line with market demand.  Section B then describes how competition and 
performance-based compensation distorted the incentives for risk-taking.  By assuming 
more risk, a bank employee could prompt a short-term rise in performance and pay—and, 
by switching jobs, she could avoid the later consequences of the risks she assumed.  The 
result was a run-up in bank risk (2003-2006)55 that contributed to the reduction in bank 
value during the financial crisis (2007-2009).56 
  
A. Competition in the Financial Markets 
 
The backdrop to our analysis of bank non-executive pay is the shift in the finan-
cial markets that occurred over the last 50 years—moving from a divided marketplace to 
one that increasingly involves competition between banks and non-banks.  The U.S. 
financial markets were divided by regulation into separate categories following the Great 
Depression, largely in response to perceived abuses leading up to the economic collapse 
of the late 1920s.57  The Glass-Steagall Act,58 for example, created a regulatory divide 
                                                 
52
 See infra notes 76-79, 94-95, 100 and accompanying text. 
53
 See infra notes 95, 100-101, 166 and accompanying text. 
54
 See infra notes 83-84, 101 and accompanying text. 
55
 See infra Part II.B. 
56
 See infra Part II.C. 
57
 Senator Carter Glass noted that speculation, fueled with funds from commercial banks, “chang[ed] 
the whole character of the banking problem.”  OPERATION OF THE NATIONAL AND FEDERAL RESERVE 
BANKING SYSTEMS, COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, S. REP. NO. 72-584, at 8 (1932).  As a result of 
the separation, financial regulation has been premised on decades-old business models—from the 1930s for 
banks, securities firms, and thrifts, and from the 1940s for investment advisors and mutual funds.  See 
Roberta S. Karmel, The Challenge to Financial Regulators Posed by Social Security Privatization, 64 
BROOK. L. REV. 1043, 1049-50, 1056-57 (1998) (describing statutory distinctions that control regulatory 
oversight). Compare Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Capital Adequacy Regulation: In Search of a 
Rationale 3 (Wharton Fin. Institutions Ctr., Working Paper No. 03-07, 2002), available at 
http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/03/0307.pdf (questioning the theoretical rationale for the division) 
with John C. Coffee Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury Have a Better Idea?, 
95 VA. L. REV. 707, 717-19 (2009) (suggesting that regulation tied to business models is durable).  For a 
description of financial intermediary categories, see Robert Charles Clark, The Federal Income Taxation of 
Financial Intermediaries, 84 YALE L.J. 1603, 1605-08 & nn.1-21 (1975); Gary Gorton, Bank Regulation 
When ‘Banks’ and ‘Banking’ Are Not the Same, OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y, Winter 1994, at 106, 107; and 
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between commercial and investment banking.59  Twenty years later, the Bank Holding 
Company Act60 extended that separation by walling off banks from the underwriting of 
insurance products.61  Those regulations began to evolve in the 1950s largely in response 
to change in the financial markets.62  That change accelerated in the 1970s and 1980s63 
with increased competition across entities and categories,64 as well as a shift in capital-
raising from traditional intermediation to lower-cost alternatives, in many cases in the 
capital markets.65  For banks, new regulatory capital requirements made it more costly to 
continue the lending business as they had before, causing them to explore new sources of 
revenue.66  Banks also experienced a decline in market share—often losing ground to 
                                                                                                                                                 
Howell E. Jackson, Regulation in a Multisectored Financial Services Industry: An Exploratory Essay, 77 
WASH. U. L. Q. 319, 322-31 (1999). 
58
 Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
12 U.S.C.).  The barrier between banking and investment banking was largely repealed by the Financial 
Services Modernization Act of 1999, also known as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. See Pub. L. No. 106-
102, § 101, 113 Stat. 1338, 1341. 
59
 See Banking Act of 1933 § 16, 48 Stat. at 184-85 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2006)); § 20, 48 
Stat. at 188-89 (repealed 1999); § 21, 48 Stat. at 189 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 378(a) (2006); § 32, 48 
Stat. at 194 (repealed 1999); see also James R. Smoot, Bank Operating Subsidiaries: Free at Last or More 
of Same?, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 651, 655-56 (1997). 
60
 Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133 (current version at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-
1844, 1846-1850 (2012)). 
61
 See Alan E. Sorcher & Satish M. Kini, Does the Term “Bank Broker-Dealer” Still Have Meaning?, 
6 N.C. BANKING INST. 227, 231 (2002). 
62
 See Franklin Allen & Anthony M. Santomero, The Theory of Financial Intermediation, 21 J. 
BANKING & FIN. 1461, 1464-74 (1997); Donald C. Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the Judicial 
Process: The Revisionist Role of the Courts in Federal Banking Regulation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 672, 677-80 
(1987); Sorcher & Kini, supra note 61, at 233; Richard J. Herring & Anthony M. Santomero, What is 
Optimal Financial Regulation? 29-35 (Wharton Fin. Institutions Ctr., Working Paper No. 00-34, 1999), 
available at http://fic.wharton.upenn. edu/fic/papers/00/0034.pdf. 
63
 See KERRY COOPER & DONALD R. FRASER, BANKING DEREGULATION AND THE NEW COMPETITION 
IN FINANCIAL SERVICES 195-217 (1st ed. 1984); see also ROBERT E. LITAN, WHAT SHOULD BANKS DO? 33-
59 (1987) (noting importance of changes at the state level); Allen N. Berger et al., The Transformation of 
the U.S. Banking Industry: What a Long, Strange Trip It’s Been, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, 
1995 No. 2, at 55, 127 (1995) (summarizing changes from 1979 onward). 
64
 See COOPER & FRASER, supra note 63, at 2-17; see also LOWELL L. BRYAN, BREAKING UP THE 
BANK: RETHINKING AN INDUSTRY UNDER SIEGE 22-28 (1988) (focusing on banks and thrifts); Franklin 
Allen & Anthony M. Santomero, What Do Financial Intermediaries Do?, 25 J. BANKING & FIN. 271, 274-
82 (2001) (showing how competition evolved through the 1990s); Michael C. Keeley, Deposit Insurance, 
Risk, and Market Power in Banking, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 1183, 1184-86 (1990) (discussing the relationship 
between competition, risk-taking, and bank and thrift failures); Sorcher & Kini, supra note 61, at 232-34 
(surveying the development of this competition). 
65
 See Ronald J. Gilson & Charles K. Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: Public Ownership, Agency 
Costs, and Complete Capital Markets, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 231, 244-47 (2008); see also Berger et al., 
supra note 63, at 68-70 (predicting changes in bank lending patterns); Merton H. Miller, Financial Innova-
tion: The Last Twenty Years and the Next, 21 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 459, 459-60 (1986) 
(suggesting innovations were primarily driven by regulation and tax structures); Peter Tufano, Financial 
Innovation, in 1A HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 307, 310-12 (George M. Constantinides et 
al. eds., 2003) (noting the ubiquity of innovations over time and the difficulty classifying them).     . 
66
 See Kevin J. Stiroh, Diversification in Banking: Is Noninterest Income the Answer?, 36 J. MONEY, 
CREDIT & BANKING 853, 853-55 (2004) (discussing increase in non-interest income); Smoot, supra  note 
59, at 654-60 (noting increase in securitization and insurance revenue). 
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less-regulated competitors.67  Regulators began to loosen their interpretation of permis-
sible activities under the Glass-Steagall Act and the Bank Holding Company Act in order 
to permit banks to offer new products and services.68   
 
Banks and non-banks increasingly began to compete, with new market partici-
pants in some cases replicating the functions of traditional intermediaries.  A classic 
example was the rise of money market funds (MMFs) and finance companies that 
together began to offer products and services similar to what banks offered, but at compe-
titive prices, drawing substantial numbers of depositors and borrowers from the banking 
industry.  MMFs are required by the federal securities laws to invest in short-term, liquid, 
high-quality debt instruments, such as Treasury bills and commercial paper.69  They offer 
investors the convenience of a bank account, including checking services, toll-free tele-
phone numbers, record-keeping, and wire transfers, but with nominally higher returns 
than bank deposits.70  Finance companies, in turn, lend to business and retail borrowers, 
relying on MMFs for funding through the sale to them of short-term commercial paper.71  
Together, MMFs and finance companies began to mirror the traditional balance between 
depositors and borrowers—but now between MMFs and finance companies—resulting in 
a substantial shift in liquid household assets from the banking sector to the capital 
markets.72 
 
Banks also began to change their business, partly to minimize regulatory costs.  
For example, during the 20 years leading up to the 2007 financial crisis, the asset-backed 
securities market was fueled by the drive toward lower-cost financing.  Banks reportedly 
were forced to move subprime assets off their balance sheets in light of the higher costs 
they incurred compared to securities firms.  As a result, assets traditionally held by banks 
moved to a “shadow” banking system comprised of structured investment vehicles and 
other financing conduits set up to minimize the effects of regulatory capital 
requirements.73  In addition, banks entered new business lines.  Since the 1980s, for 
                                                 
67
 See Allen & Santomero, supra note 62, at 1466-74; Herring & Santomero, supra note 62, at 27-30; 
Matthew Richardson et al., Large Banks and the Volcker Rule, in REGULATING WALL ST.; THE DODD-
FRANK ACT AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL FINANCE 187-88 (Viral V. Acharya et al. eds., 
2011).   
68
 See Thomas G. Fischer et al., The Securities Activities of Commercial Banks: A Legal and Economic 
Analysis, 51 TENN. L. REV. 467, 474-502 (1984); Sorcher & Kini, supra note 61, at 233-34. 
69
 See 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7 (2013); see also MONEY MARKET WORKING GROUP, INVESTMENT 
COMPANY INSTITUTE, REPORT OF THE MONEY MARKET WORKING GROUP 31-39 (2009), available at 
http://www.ici.org/pdf/ppr_09_mmwg.pdf (describing regulation of MMFs). 
70
 See FRANKLIN R. EDWARDS, THE NEW FINANCE REGULATION AND FINANCIAL STABILITY 16 (1996). 
71
 See Jane W. D’Arista & Tom Schlesinger, ECON. POLICY INST., THE PARALLEL BANKING SYSTEM 3-
4, 7-14 (1993), available at http://www.epi.org/publication/epi_virlib_briefingpapers_1993_ parallelb/.    
72
 See EDWARDS, supra note 70, at 73-74; D’Arista & Schlesinger, supra note 71, at 3-4, 7-14. 
73
 See Floyd Norris, No Way To Make A Loan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2007, at C1; Timothy F. Geithner, 
President and Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Reducing Systemic Risk in a Dynamic 
Financial System (June 9, 2008), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2008/tfg 
080609.html; see also Aaron Unterman, Innovative Destruction—Structured Finance and Credit Market 
Reform in the Bubble Era, 5 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 53, 59 (2009).  As Representative Barney Frank recalled, 
former Citigroup Chairman and CEO, Chuck Prince, told him that off-balance sheet financing was neces-
sary because on-balance sheet financing “would have put Citigroup at a disadvantage with Wall Street 
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example, banks began trading commodity derivatives—financial contracts whose values 
are linked to changes in the price of a referenced commodity, such as oil or iron ore.  
More recently, banks began to buy and sell the physical commodities underlying those 
derivatives—in some cases, requiring them to take ownership and delivery of the com-
modity itself—as an activity that was “complementary” to their derivatives business.74   
 
The financial markets continue to converge as banks and non-banks compete 
across traditional business lines.75  Greater homogeneity in products and services has also 
sharpened the competition for the same employees, who increasingly overlap in skills and 
qualities.76  The upshot, as described next, has been growth in the demand for talent as 
banks and non-banks compete to hire the same people—and, like change in the financial 
industry generally, a shift in how banks hire and compensate non-executives. 
B. Competition’s Effects on Compensation and Risk-Taking 
Bankers were paid a largely-fixed salary before the financial markets began to 
converge.  Performance incentives were less important, since bankers were not expected 
to seek substantial returns.  That changed—with a rise in performance-based pay—as 
competition between banks and non-banks grew.77  How compensation was set shifted 
                                                                                                                                                 
investment banks that were more loosely regulated and were allowed to take far greater risks.”  Nelson D. 
Schwartz & Julie Creswell, What Created This Monster? Yes, the Markets Can Bite Back, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 23, 2008, at BU1. 
74
 In 2003, for example, following its acquisition of Salomon Brothers, Citigroup became the first bank 
holding company to obtain bank regulatory approval of its commodity-trading unit’s buying and selling of 
physical commodities.  That approval included trading in commodities on the spot market, as well as taking 
and making physical delivery of commodities to settle commodity derivatives.  See Dietrich Domanski & 
Alexandra Heath, Financial Investors and Commodity Markets, BIS Q. REV., Mar. 2007, 53, 65-66, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1600058 (describing the rise of financial investors in the commodities 
market); see also Saule T. Omarova, The Merchants of Wall Street: Banking, Commerce, and Commodities 
98 MINN. L. REV. 265, 297-307 (describing the growth of bank trading in commodities).  
75
 See Gorton, supra note 57, at 116-18; Jonathan R. Macey, Derivative Instruments: Lessons for the 
Regulatory State, 21 J. CORP. L. 69, 78 (1995); Robert C. Merton, Operation and Regulation in Financial 
Intermediation: A Functional Perspective, in OPERATION AND REGULATION OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 17, 
33-41 (Peter Englund ed., 1993).  Some new regulation limits competition.  For example, section 619 of the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, commonly known as the “Volcker Rule,” 
limits financial market competition (with some exceptions) by, among other things, prohibiting a “banking 
entity” from “engag[ing] in proprietary trading” or “acquir[ing] or retain[ing] any equity, partnership, or 
other ownership interest in or sponsor[ing] a hedge fund or private equity fund.” 12 U.S.C. § 
1851(a)(1)(A)-(B) (2012). 
76
 See Acharya et al., Seeking Alpha, supra note 12, at 4 (describing the skills of financial sector 
employees as being “highly fungible”). 
77
 See Kevin J. Murphy, Regulating Banking Bonuses in the European Union: A Case Study in 
Unintended Consequences 4 (Univ. of S. Cal. Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 13-8, 2013), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2235395 (noting that, as banks moved into investment banking, they “faced a 
growing tension between . . . traditional commercial bankers—paid high salaries with relatively little 
performance-based pay—and the professionals in its investment-banking divisions.  Ultimately, commer-
cial banks began offering investment-banking-type remuneration for top performers throughout the 
organization.”).  The result was a substantial increase in financial sector compensation.  From 1980 
onwards, the financial sector became a high-skill and high-wage industry (compared to other sectors of the 
U.S. economy), in line with changes in regulation that permitted greater competition across the financial 
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from being an internal process to increasingly being determined by what others in the 
marketplace would pay—including investment banks and, more recently, hedge funds.78  
Individual banks adjusted what they paid in order to remain competitive.79   
 
Tying compensation to financial performance was designed to align employees’ 
and employers’ interests.80  The change in pay structure, however, created two problems.  
First, it distorted an employee’s risk incentives.  Banks are unable to assess an 
employee’s risk-adjusted results unless she remains at the bank long enough for the con-
sequences of her strategy to materialize.81  A bank employee, therefore, can anticipate 
being rewarded in the short-term for higher returns, regardless of whether they resulted 
from her talent (her ability to outperform the market) or excessive risk-taking.  She has a 
particular interest in concealing her high-risk strategy from others—making it appear as if 
she outperformed her peers based on talent alone.82  The result is an overall increase in 
                                                                                                                                                 
markets.  See Thomas Philippon & Ariell Reshef, Wages and Human Capital in the U.S. Finance Industry: 
1909-2006, 127 Q. J. ECON. 1551, 1552 (2012).  
78
 See Milton Harris & Bengt Holmstrom, A Theory of Wage Dynamics, 49 REV. ECON. STUD. 315, 316 
(1982) (noting that compensation is influenced by what competing employers are willing to pay).  When an 
agent has an outside option—and can accept a job offer from a competitor if bargaining with her employer 
fails—the principal must design the agent’s contract to match the agent’s other opportunities in order to 
induce her to accept the contract.  See Jonathan Levin, Relational Incentive Contracts, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 
835, 836 (2003).  Although banks are subject to the Compensation Guidance, other prospective 
employers—including securities firms and hedge funds—are not.  See Compensation Guidance, supra note 
6, at 36,396.   
79
 As the Treasury Department, the Fed, and the FDIC noted when summarizing comments on the 
proposed Compensation Guidance: 
 
Several commenters . . . expressed concern that the proposed guidance, if implemented, could 
impede the ability of banking organizations to attract or retain qualified staff and compete with 
other financial services providers. In light of these concerns, some commenters suggested that the 
guidance expressly allow banking organizations to enter into such compensation arrangements as 
they deem necessary for recruitment or retention purposes. A number of commenters also encour-
aged the Federal Reserve to work with other domestic and foreign supervisors and authorities to 
promote consistent standards for incentive compensation practices at financial institutions and a 
level competitive playing field for financial service providers. 
 
Compensation Guidance, supra note 6, at 36,398.   
80
 Non-executive pay shares goals similar to those identified for executive compensation, namely (i) 
rewarding success, (ii) providing incentives, (iii) retaining and attracting talent, and (iv) aligning share-
holder and employee interests.  See Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Say on Pay”: Cautionary Notes on the U.K. Exper-
ience and the Case for Shareholder Opt-In, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 323, 329 (2009) (listing the goals of 
executive compensation).  See also supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
81
 See Acharya et al., Seeking Alpha, supra note 12, at 3-4; Bannier et al., supra note 12, at 655-56.   
82
 An employee who seeks to conceal a high-risk strategy may pursue complicated projects that are 
difficult for an employer to monitor or jump to a new job before the risks are realized so that management 
of the projects moves to someone else.  See Igor Makarov & Guillaume Plantin, Rewarding Trading Skills 
Without Inducing Gambling 1-3 (Apr. 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1571545 (describing the incentive of fund managers to incur risk without detection in order to 
manipulate reputations and attract more funds).  Even managers who can differentiate among potential 
hires may lack the incentive to do so, out of concern that this may delay the hiring process and risk losing 
the best performers to competitors.  See Roy C. Smith, Greed is Good, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7-8, 2009, at W1, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123396915233059229.html#CX (“You had to pay everyone 
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risk-taking, which can boost short-term performance and pay, but potentially at the 
expense of long-term bank value,83 also referred to as a “tail-risk strategy.”84  
 
Consider the following example.  During 2005-2007, JPMorgan’s bankers under-
wrote residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) totaling $10.28 billion.85  Investors 
relied on cash flows from pools of residential mortgages for the payment of principal and 
interest on the RMBS, although important loan-level data were often difficult to obtain86 
or were unreliable.87  JPMorgan purchased those mortgages from the firms that originated 
them.  From January 2006 to September 2007, its bankers learned that a number of the 
loans were substandard—meaning that the mortgages failed to comply with the origina-
tor’s own underwriting guidelines or have sufficient compensating factors to justify 
including them in an RMBS pool.88  Excluding them would have improved the credit 
quality of the RMBS, but too many exclusions would have caused the originators to do 
                                                                                                                                                 
well . . . because there was always someone trying to poach your best trained people, whom you didn’t 
want to lose even if they were not superstars.”).  Risk managers also may have little incentive to control 
risk to the extent that minimizing risk is not valued by the bank (or if the value is difficult to measure) and 
doing so lowers the bank’s short-term performance.  See Karl S. Okamoto, After the Bailout: Regulating 
Systemic Moral Hazard, 57 UCLA L. REV. 183, 216-18 (2009).  Consequently, the failure to take account 
of the employees’ interest in concealing high-risk strategies—by using revenues, rather than risk-adjusted 
profits, to set compensation—was found by senior financial regulators after the financial crisis to be one 
critical area of risk management that requires improvement.  See SENIOR SUPERVISORS GROUP, RISK 
MANAGEMENT LESSONS FROM THE GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS OF 2008 24-25 (2009), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/report102109.pdf (“Individual performance measurement schemes 
have often not reflected true economic profits, adjusted for known costs and uncertainty.”)  See also 
MATHIAS DEWATRIPONT & JEAN TIROLE, THE PRUDENTIAL REGULATION OF BANKS 120 (1994) 
(suggesting that the limited verifiability of an agent’s actions makes performance-based compensation an 
insufficient discipline).   
83
 See RAGHURAM G. RAJAN, FAULT LINES:  HOW HIDDEN FRACTURES STILL THREATEN THE WORLD 
ECONOMY 137-39 (2010) (explaining how bankers’ search for “alpha” (excess returns) resulted in the 
undertaking of excessive risk); see also Raghuram G. Rajan, Has Financial Development Made the World 
Riskier?, in THE GREENSPAN ERA: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 313, 315-17 (2005) (same); Krishnan 
Sharma, Financial Sector Compensation and Excess Risk-taking—A Consideration of the Issues and Policy 
Lessons 2 (U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Social Affairs, Working Paper No. 115, 2012), available at http://www. 
un.org/esa/desa/papers/2012/wp115_2012.pdf (observing that asymmetries in the “term magnitude and 
probability of gain and losses” combined to encourage the undertaking of tail risk in the banking sector).  
84
 Tail risk is less likely to occur than other risk, although its magnitude may be significant.  See 
RAJAN, supra note 83, at 137; see also Acharya et al., Seeking Alpha, supra note 12, at 3 (observing that it 
may be easier for financial sector employees to undertake tail-risk strategies due to potential long-run 
losses). 
85
 This example is drawn from the Justice Department’s statement of facts that was publicly released in 
connection with its $13 billion settlement with JPMorgan. See U.S. Department of Justice, Statement of 
Facts, 1-2 & n.2 (Nov. 19, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/9432013111915103 
1990622.pdf [hereinafter Statement of Facts]. 
86
 See Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, The Global Financial Crisis:  A Plan for Regulatory 
Reform 146-48 (2009), available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/TGFC-CCMR_Report_(5-26-09).pdf 
(survey of institutional investors indicating that one-third of the data fields that most surveyed investors 
thought  “essential” typically was not disclosed). 
87
 See, e.g., Christopher Papagianis, Housing Market in Crisis, E21 COMMENTARY SERIES (Nov. 19, 
2010), available at http://economics21.org/commentary/housing-market-crisis. 
88
 See Statement of Facts, supra note 85, at 4.   
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business elsewhere—potentially causing a drop in JPMorgan’s revenues.89  Since the 
bankers’ performance was measured by profitability, they had an incentive to include 
lower-quality loans in the mortgage pools (in many instances, without JPMorgan’s execu-
tives or customers being able to differentiate among them).  As a result, rather than 
exclude the loans, the bankers directed that a number of them be waived into the pools.90  
Based on one report, 27 percent of the loans JPMorgan purchased during the period were 
substandard, although the bankers accepted roughly 50 percent of them.91  
  
Second, greater competition for talent lowered the natural constraint on risk-
taking created by long-term employment, increasing the possibility of employee moral 
hazard.92  An employee’s outside job options are limited in a heterogeneous industry.  Job 
skills tend to be specific to a particular employer, resulting in longer-term employment 
that permits the employer to better assess an employee and, based on outcome, adjust her 
compensation and responsibilities.93  A lack of mobility and the potential for negative 
long-term results, with a resulting drop in pay, are likely to weigh against a high-risk 
strategy.  That constraint weakens as the industry becomes more homogeneous (as 
occurred with the financial industry94) and where, in a fluid labor market, the employee 
can jump to a competitor before any long-term losses materialize.  Having performed 
well in the short-term, the employee can move to a new employer—seeking 
compensation based on her performance, but again without her employer being able to 
assess whether that performance was due to talent or a tail-risk strategy.95  The result is a 
negative externality—each bank naturally competes for the same employees based on 
how well they do in the short-term, making it difficult for any one employer to unila-
terally implement pay incentives that adjust for risk-taking and long-term outcomes.96  
                                                 
89
 See THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 166 
(2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf.   
90
 See Statement of Facts, supra note 85, at 4-5.   
91
 See id. at 5. 
92
 See Acharya et al., Seeking Alpha, supra note 12, at 2-3.   
93
 See Robert Parrino, CEO Turnover and Outside Succession: A Cross-Sectional Analysis, 46 J. FIN. 
ECON. 165, 179 (1997) (“[E]vidence suggests that industry-specific human capital is highly valued in most 
industries.”). 
94
 See supra Part I.A. 
95
 See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.   
96
 See Acharya et al., Seeking Alpha, supra note 12, at 2-3; Thanassoulis, supra note 11, at 849-50; 
Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening, and Multitasking 1-2 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18936, 2013), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/ 
w18936 (observing that outside job options may limit an employer’s ability to manage its employees).  The 
competition for managerial talent may also produce a similar negative externality by incentivizing firms to 
choose to underinvest in corporate governance (providing higher levels of compensation and lower levels 
of discipline for managers) in order to remain competitive as employers.  See Viral V. Acharya & Paolo F. 
Volpin, Corporate Governance Externalities, 14 REV. FIN. 1, 2-3 (2010) (developing a theoretical model to 
illustrate the production of negative governance externalities by competition); David L. Dicks, Executive 
Compensation and the Role for Corporate Governance Regulation, 25 REV. FIN. STUDIES 1971, 1971-72 
(2012) (same); Viral Acharya et al., Competition for Managers, Corporate Governance and Incentive 
Compensation 1-2 (Oct. 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://faculty.london.edu/ 
pvolpin/compensation.pdf (providing empirical support); see also Ing-Haw Cheng, Corporate Governance 
Spillovers 1-5 (Apr. 10, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1299652 
(describing the spillover effects of poor corporate governance on peer firms in a competitive labor market).  
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Employee who chooses that approach will benefit from a higher Employee Payoff at point 
B.  Of course, if the Employee is talented, she could also receive compensation at point B 
by selecting a Low Risk strategy.  On balance, however, an Employee who selects a Low 
Risk strategy is more likely to contribute less to Bank Performance in the Short-Term 
and, therefore, receive compensation at point A, corresponding to medium performance. 
 
In a non-competitive market, an Employee who selects a Low Risk strategy and 
remains with her first employer (subject to her Original Contract) is likely in the Long-
Term to contribute to Bank Performance and receive an Employee Payoff corresponding 
to point D.  By contrast, if the Employee opts for a High Risk strategy, she is likely to 
realize lower Long-Term compensation when the negative consequences of that strategy 
materialize at point C.  Hence, in a market with limited employee mobility, an Employee 
has an incentive to select a Low Risk strategy in order to avoid the longer-term losses that 
can arise from a riskier strategy.  
 
In a competitive market, Employee compensation increases as banks and other 
financial firms bid for high performers, shifting pay upward in the Long-Term to the New 
Contract.100  In such a market, an Employee who pursues a Low Risk strategy with 
medium performance may be able to increase her compensation from point D to point F.  
More significantly, an Employee who pursues a High Risk strategy can more easily 
switch jobs due to how well she did—the high level of Bank Performance—in the Short-
Term and, in turn, avoid the Long-Term losses of her riskier strategy.  In fact, since a new 
employer’s assessment is based only on Short-Term Bank Performance, the Employee 
may be able to negotiate a New Contract—starting from an Employee Payoff at point E—
as if she had generated the greater returns based on superior talent (rather than excessive 
risk-taking).101  By adopting the same High Risk strategy at her new employer, the 
Employee can then increase her compensation from point E to point G—with an overall 
rise in total pay from point C (the point where her compensation would have reflected the 
Long-Term losses from her High Risk strategy) to point G.  
 
In addition, since a Low Risk strategy is more likely to underperform a High Risk 
strategy in the Short-Term, and since Employee Payoff is determined by Bank Perfor-
mance and not by levels of risk-taking, both less-talented and talented Employees have an 
incentive to pursue a High Risk strategy that increases the likelihood of higher compensa-
                                                 
100
 See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text. 
101
 Thus, the competition for non-executives creates an adverse selection and a moral hazard problem. 
An employer who is unable to tell whether a new hire’s performance resulted from talent or increased risk-
taking faces an adverse selection problem.  Moral hazard arises when a bank employee has the incentive to 
pursue a Short-Term High Risk strategy and then move to a new employer before any losses materialize.  
See supra notes 40, 81-82, 95and accompanying text.   
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tion at points B and G.102  Doing so, however, also increases the likelihood of greater 
bank losses over the Long-Term.103 
 
The upshot is that growing competition for financial talent has distorted the rela-
tionship between compensation and performance.  Increased mobility provides non-exe-
cutives with the means to take on greater risk without facing the consequences—first, by 
improving short-term performance and, in turn, increasing their compensation (either by 
current or future employers) and, second, by permitting them to sidestep the long-term 
losses that result from excessive risk-taking.  As a result, non-executive pay in banks is 
no longer an internally set feature of employment.  Instead, as we set out empirically in 
the next Part, it is determined by the market’s demand for talent.  
 
II.  BANK COMPENSATION AND RISK-TAKING:  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Part I set out our explanation of the relationship among bank non-executive com-
pensation, the competition for talent, and risk-taking.  In this Part, we offer a reduced and 
modified version of a recent empirical study, co-authored by one of us, that investigates 
non-executive compensation in a sample of 77 U.S. bank holding companies over the 
period 2003-2009.104  This study delivers two major results that support our earlier 
explanation.  First, it shows that bank non-executive compensation before the financial 
crisis (2003-2006) was tied largely to short-term bank performance, contributing to the 
increased bank risk and reduced bank value that occurred during the financial crisis 
(2007-2009).  Second, it demonstrates the impact of market factors—rather than indivi-
dual choices by top executives—on non-executive incentives and, in turn, on bank risk 
and bank value.  The result has been an industry-wide increase in compensation that 
failed to take account of the increased risk-taking that arose from each bank’s interest in 
hiring the strongest performers.  We turn to those findings next. 
  
                                                 
102
 If compensation is tied to short-term results, other employees—even if they are normally inclined to 
pursue less-risky strategies—are more likely to incur greater risk rather than underperform colleagues and 
potentially face a drop in pay.  See Sherwin Rosen, The Economics of Superstars, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 845, 
846-47 (1981). 
103
 See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text. 
104
 See Acharya et al., Non-Executive Incentives, supra note 12, at passim.  One key difference is that 
this Article uses net income rather than interest income as a measure to estimate bank performance.  Id. at 
3-4, 9 (acknowledging the use of total interest income in the main specifications).  Our reliance on net 
income is consistent with how bank bonuses are set.  The shift in bank compensation away from largely 
fixed to contingent (bonus) payments replicated the use of bonuses within the investment banking world.  
See Rajan, supra note 83, at 315-17; Murphy, supra note 77, at 3.  That reliance on bonuses continues 
today, with base salaries constituting only a small portion of total pay for professional employees and year-
end bonuses set on the basis of individual, group, and firm performance.  See Bannier et al., supra note 12, 
at 654; Murphy, supra note 77, at 4. 
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A. Non-Executive Incentives and Bank Performance  
 
Public data on bank non-executive pay is limited.  The Bank Regulatory database 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago,105 which collects quarterly data on, among other 
items, bank balance sheets and income statements, only provides information on total 
compensation (for executives and non-executives).  Unlike data on top management com-
pensation, which is available from the ExecuComp database,106 no dedicated database 
exists for non-executive pay.  
 
The solution is to derive changes in non-executive pay from changes in total bank 
compensation.  Non-executive pay can be measured for each bank by computing how it 
adjusts its quarterly total compensation (obtained from the Bank Regulatory database), 
net of its quarterly executive pay (obtained from the ExecuComp database).  In order to 
assess incentive effect, quarterly changes in pay can then be related to the quarter’s 
variation in bank profits (as a proxy for bank performance, obtained from the Bank 
Regulatory database).  Computing changes on a quarterly basis is important, because it 
captures the sensitivity of non-executive incentives to short-term bank performance.  
Also important is differentiating the components of pay in order to verify whether cash 
and stock compensation have different effects.  Accordingly, the following measures 
were estimated for each bank over the  period 2003-2006:107  (i) CASH COMP. INCENT.—
computed as the quarterly variation in total salary, bonus, and net benefits granted to each 
bank’s non-executives relative to the quarter’s variation in bank profits; (ii) STOCK COMP. 
INCENT.—computed as the quarterly variation in total payments in stock granted to each 
bank’s non-executives relative to the quarter’s variation in bank profits; and (iii) TOTAL 
COMP. INCENT.—computed as the quarterly variation in total salary, bonus, net benefits, 
and stock granted to each bank’s non-executives relative to the quarter’s variation in bank 
profits. 
 
Identifying the distinct roles played by market-wide and firm-specific effects in 
setting non-executive incentives is also critical.  Non-executive cash incentives (CASH 
COMP. INCENT.) were divided into two components, one for market effects (CASH COMP. 
                                                 
105
 The Bank Regulatory database collects financial information that the Fed and the FDIC require all 
bank holding companies to file using FR Y-9C reports.  Pursuant to the Bank Holding Company Act, a 
bank holding company is defined as “any company which has control over any bank or over any company 
that is or becomes a bank holding company.”  See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (2012).  For a detailed 
description of the financial information bank holding companies are required to disclose in FR Y-9C 
reports, see BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, FORM FR Y-9C (last updated Dec. 
18, 2013), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/apps/reportforms/reportdetail.aspx?sOoYJ+5BzD 
al8cbqnRxZRg==.   
106
 The ExecuComp database provides information on executives at S&P 1000 firms, including infor-
mation on salaries, bonuses, and stock options since 1992.  Note that, since the ExecuComp database only 
provides data on an annual basis, the data are pro-rated in the estimates employed in Acharya et al., Non-
Executive Incentives, supra note 12, at 7-8. 
107
 For the technical specifications of these measures, see Acharya et al., Non-Executive Incentives, 
supra note 12, at 9 (Equation 1).  
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INCENT. (MARKET)) and the other for firm effects (CASH COMP. INCENT. (FIRM)).108  The 
market-effects component measures the quarterly cash compensation variation for each 
bank relative to the quarter’s variation in market profits.  For each bank, the “market” 
corresponds to a reference peer group comprised of five other banks whose headquarters 
are located in the same state or neighboring states.109  The firm-effects component mea-
sures the quarterly cash compensation variation for each bank relative to the quarter’s 
variation in individual bank profits after market effects are taken into account.110  
 
Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics for Main Variables 
 
  Mean Standard Deviation 
Independent Variables (2003-2006):111   
 
CASH COMP. INCENT. 
 0.98 0.75 
STOCK COMP. INCENT.  
 0.89 1.103 
TOTAL COMP. INCENT. 
 0.97 0.072 
CASH COMP. INCENT. (MARKET) 
 1.00 0.090 
CASH COMP. INCENT. (FIRM) 
 0.07 4.455 
Dependent Variables (2007-2009): 
 
Bank Risk  0.071 0.044 
Bank Value 
 1.049 0.171 
 
Table 1 sets out Mean and Standard Deviation data for the main variables used in 
this Article’s empirical analysis.  The data confirm that bank employee compensation 
was mainly driven by short-term (quarterly) bank profits.  As shown in the first column 
(Mean), a $1.00 quarterly increase (decrease) in bank profits corresponded on average to 
a 98¢ increase (decrease) in cash compensation in the next quarter, and a $1.00 quarterly 
increase (decrease) in market profits corresponded on average to a $1.00 increase 
(decrease) in cash compensation in the next quarter.  
 
Significantly, once market effects were taken into account, a $1.00 quarterly 
increase (decrease) in an individual bank’s relative profits corresponded on average to 
                                                 
108
 For a more detailed discussion of the specific econometric technique employed to separate market 
effects and firm effects, see Acharya et al., Non-Executive Incentives, supra note 12, at 10 (Equation 2). 
109
 For example, Citigroup’s peer group includes five other bank holding companies headquartered in 
New York:  JP Morgan Chase & Co., Metlife Inc., Bank of New York Mellon Corp., M&T Bank Corp., 
and New York Community Bancorp Inc.  See Acharya et al., Non-Executive Incentives, supra note 12, at 
11-12 (describing in more detail the construction of peer groups).  
110
 As compared to CASH COMP. INCENT., CASH COMP. INCENT. (FIRM) is designed to measure changes 
in a bank’s compensation relative to changes in profits that are specific to that bank and uncorrelated to 
changes in market profits.  See id. at 10-12. 
111
 The statistical data on independent variables in Table 1 are based on a sample of 88 U.S. bank 
holding companies, while the regressions described in the text are based on a sample of 77 U.S. bank 
holding companies.  Regressions were not possible for 11 U.S. bank holding companies that went out of 
business during 2007-2009. 
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only a 7¢ increase (decrease) in bank employee cash compensation.  This suggests, con-
sistent with our earlier analysis,112 that the bulk of the effect on employee compensation 
was tied to changes in market profits rather than individual bank earnings.  Compensation 
for non-executive employees was essentially driven by market-wide results rather than on 
how well a specific bank performed relative to the industry. 
 
B. Non-Executive Incentives and Bank Risk-Taking  
 
In Section A, we showed that non-executive incentives during 2003-2006 were 
predominantly tied to short-term market profits.  The next step is to verify the impact of 
those incentives on longer-term bank risk.  Our claim was that non-executive incentives 
promoted riskier strategies whose results emerged during the financial crisis.113  Bank 
Risk, therefore, was estimated as aggregate risk during 2007-2009,114 using the standard 
deviation of a bank’s weekly excess return (defined as the weekly return of a bank’s 
stock, less the weekly return of the S&P 500) over the calendar year.  
 
As shown in Table 2 below, the greater a bank’s non-executive incentives were 
during 2003-2006, the greater the Bank Risk during 2007-2009.  This finding is consistent 
with our conclusion that a rise in the competition for talent would cause a bank to rely on 
short-term performance in setting employee pay (2003-2006), without adjusting it to 
account for risk-taking and longer-term (2007-2009) outcomes.115 
  
                                                 
112
  See supra notes 77-79, 100 and accompanying text.  
113
 See supra notes 83-84, 100-101 and accompanying text. 
114
 It is unlikely that high bank risk during the financial crisis determined pre-crisis non-executive pay, 
since this would imply that banks and the market for non-executives were able to anticipate the effects of 
the financial crisis before they occurred and adjust non-executive pay in anticipation of those effects.  
Measuring non-executive incentives before the financial crisis and Bank Risk only during the financial 
crisis mitigates endogeneity concerns.  See Acharya et al., Non-Executive Incentives, supra note 12, at 21, 
31-32. 
115
 See supra notes 81-82, 95-96 and accompanying text.  Although compensation was not the sole 
cause of the financial crisis, its effect on risk was widely recognized as an important cause of the losses that 
resulted.  See Grant Kirkpatrick, The Corporate Governance Lessons from the Financial Crisis, FIN. 
MARKET TRENDS, Sept. 25, 2009, at 72-76 (stating that remuneration and incentive systems played a key 
role in favoring excessive bank risk-taking); INST. OF INT’L FIN., COMPENSATION IN FINANCIAL SERVICES: 
INDUSTRY PROGRESS AND THE AGENDA FOR CHANGE 2, 10 (2009), www.iif.com/download.php?id= 
YgXfGGw8KEA= (stating that 98 percent of survey respondents believed that compensation practices 
were one cause of the financial crisis); SENIOR SUPERVISORS GROUP, OBSERVATIONS ON RISK MANAGE-
MENT PRACTICES DURING THE RECENT MARKET TURBULENCE 7 (2008), http://www.newyorkfed.org/ 
newsevents/news/banking/2008/SSG_Risk_Mgt_doc_final.pdf  (noting that for many firms compensation 
and other incentives were not sufficiently well-designed to balance risk appetite and risk control); UBS, 
SHAREHOLDER REPORT ON UBS’S WRITE-DOWNS 32, 41-42 (2008), http://www.ubs.com/1/ShowMedia/ 
investors/agm?contentId=140333&name=080418ShareholderReport.pdf (finding the incentive effects of 
UBS’s compensation practices to be one overarching cause of its subprime mortgage losses).   
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Table 2.  Bank Risk and Compensation Incentives116 
 
  
 Bank Risk (2007-2009) 
Independent Variables (2003-2006) (1) (2) (3) 
CASH COMP. INCENT.  0.0516***   
t-stat (3.98)   
STOCK COMP. INCENT.   -0.0005*  
t-stat  (1.75)  
TOTAL COMP. INCENT.    0.066*** 
t-stat   (3.03) 
Percentage Effect117  30.5% -4.3% 37.7% 
Observations  231 231 231 
Adjusted R-squared  41% 40% 41% 
 
 
Table 2 shows that all non-executive incentives had an impact on Bank Risk that 
is statistically significant, but the direction of the impact varied.  Specifically, for CASH 
COMP. INCENT. (shown in column 1), there was a positive effect on Bank Risk.  This 
means that the more sensitive non-executive cash compensation (total salary, bonus, and 
net benefits) was to a bank’s profits in 2003-2006, the greater the increase in Bank Risk 
over the period 2007-2009.  The economic significance of this effect is notable, with 
CASH COMP. INCENT. being responsible on average for a 30.5 percent increase in Bank 
Risk during the financial crisis.  By contrast, for STOCK COMP. INCENT. (shown in column 
2), there was a negative effect on Bank Risk—meaning that the more sensitive non-
executive stock compensation was to a bank’s profits in 2003-2006, the lower the Bank 
Risk in 2007-2009.   
 
Both results are consistent with our theoretical analysis.  With growth in the com-
petition for talent, and a reliance on near-term performance to set compensation, non-
executive cash compensation failed to reflect the resulting increase in risk-taking incen-
tives.118  Stock compensation, however, involves different dynamics, especially in the 
                                                 
116
 The *** , **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. This means that 
the null hypothesis (the hypothesis that an independent variable has no impact on a dependent variable) 
cannot be rejected with a probability of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  In statistics, when the significance 
level is above 10%, it is standard to consider the result to be statistically insignificant or uninformative.  
117
 The percentage effects correspond to a one standard deviation increase in the dependent variable 
(Bank Risk) given a one standard deviation increase in the independent variables (the measures of non-
executive incentives).  See Acharya et al., Non-Executive Incentives, supra note 12, at 25 n.20 (including a 
detailed discussion of the computations underlying the calculation of each percentage effect). 
118
 See supra notes 81-82, 95-96 and accompanying text.  As financial regulators reported in the wake 
of the financial crisis, “Historical compensation arrangements were generally not sensitive to risk and 
skewed incentives to maximize revenues . . . .  Firms largely acknowledged that current compensation 
practices, or those in place prior to the crisis, created strong incentives to maximize revenues rather than 
risk-, capital-, and liquidity-adjusted earnings.”  See SENIOR SUPERVISORS GROUP, supra note 82, at 24.  
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form of restricted stock and other deferred equity plans.  This kind of incentive is more 
likely to internalize the costs of an employee’s risk-taking, because higher risk is likely to 
correlate with lower future stock values.119   
 
In our sample of banks, stock compensation accounted on average for only two 
percent of total compensation, with the remaining 98 percent comprised of cash.120  The 
principal reliance on cash compensation explains the overall effect of non-executive pay 
in increasing Bank Risk.  It is also consistent with the influence of market demand on 
how non-executive pay is set.  Compensation tied to longer-term results becomes less 
attractive as it becomes more common to reward employees for short-term performance.  
For employees, a cash bonus is likely to be more desirable than equal compensation in 
stock whose value may not be realized until the future.  Consequently, in a competitive 
market, employees—and the employers interested in making the best hires—are more 
likely to favor cash over stock compensation.121   
 
Earlier we noted that non-executive pay is largely tied to market profits.122  Based 
on that finding, we suspected that the effect of non-executive incentives on Bank Risk 
was primarily driven by their market component.  The empirical results in Table 3 below 
support our view. 
 
  
                                                 
119
 Those results contrast with the analysis of executive compensation in Bebchuk & Spamann, supra 
note 9, at 275-76 (“[R]estricted stock could tie executive payoffs to an even more highly levered bet on the 
value of the assets of the bank, and thus, give executives highly distorted incentives” to engage in excessive 
risk-taking), but support the compensation proposal made in Bhagat & Romano, supra note 9, at 363-71, as 
well as our own proposal to require that a component of non-executive compensation be tied to long-term 
equity.  See infra Part III.C. 
120
 See Acharya et al., Non-Executive Incentives, supra note 12, at 3, 19, 22; see also Bernard S. 
Sharfman, Using the Law to Reduce Systemic Risk, 36 J. CORP. L. 607, 616-17 (2011) (describing reliance 
on annual cash bonuses). 
121
 Employers who choose to reflect long-term performance in what they pay may also need to increase 
the value the employee can realize over time in order to remain competitive.  See Michael C. Jensen & 
Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives—It’s Not How Much You Pay, But How, HARV. BUS. REV., May-June 
1990, at 138, 149.  For example, if a bank continues to do well over the long-term, the amount the 
employee gains on her restricted stock or stock options should be greater than what she would have 
received up front in cash.  This may partly account for the eight percent drop in Wall Street cash bonuses in 
2010, but the overall increase in pay—largely comprised of deferred compensation—by six percent during 
the same year.  See Brett Philbin, Wall Street Cash Bonuses Fall, Despite Strong Profit, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 
24, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703775704576162731016064512.   
122
 See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
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Table 3.  Bank Risk and  
Cash Compensation Incentives: Market and Firm 123 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            
 
 
We focus here on non-executive cash compensation (CASH COMP. INCENT.), since, 
as noted earlier, this was the dominant component of non-executive pay before the 
financial crisis.125  Table 3 shows that, once market factors are separated from firm 
factors, the effect of CASH COMP. INCENT. (MARKET) on Bank Risk is significantly greater 
than CASH COMP. INCENT. (FIRM).  The effect of CASH COMP. INCENT. (MARKET) is posi-
tive and statistically significant, leading to an average increase in Bank Risk of 40 
percent.  By contrast, the effect of CASH COMP. INCENT. (FIRM) on Bank Risk is statisti-
cally insignificant.   
 
Finally, we note that the results in Table 3, as well as in Table 4 below, were 
controlled for executive incentives (measured over the same period as non-executive 
incentives, 2003-2006) and the results persisted126—meaning that executive incentives 
                                                 
123
 The *** , **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  See supra note 
116. 
124
 The percentage effects correspond to a one standard deviation increase in the dependent variable 
(Bank Risk) given a one standard deviation increase in the independent variables (CASH COMP. INCENT. 
(MARKET) and CASH COMP. INCENT. (FIRM)).  See Acharya et al., Non-Executive Incentives, supra note 12, 
at 26 (including a detailed discussion of the computations underlying the calculation of each percentage 
effect). 
125
 See supra note 120 and accompanying text.   
126
 The regressions in Tables 3 and 4 were also controlled for several additional variables (estimated 
during 2003-2006) that were likely to have an impact on Bank Risk, including (i) bank size; (ii) past bank 
profitability (ROA); (iii) total deposits to total assets; (iv) Tier-1 capital to total assets; (v) total loans to total 
assets; (vi) past bad loans to total assets; (vii) ratio of underwriter assets to total bank assets; (viii) ratio of 
insurance assets to total bank assets; (ix) ratio of derivative products trading to total assets; and (x) ratio of 
derivative hedging to total assets.  Control (i) is included because large banks are more likely to benefit 
from various forms of governmental support and, therefore, they may have greater incentives to engage in 
excessive risk-taking.  Control (ii) reflects the possibility that banks that have previously failed to achieve 
expected returns may be more inclined to undertake riskier investments.  Control (iii) is included, because 
deposits are a financial source that is largely insensitive to risk (due to FDIC insurance) and, therefore, 
 
 
 
Bank Risk (2007-2009) 
Independent Variables (2003-2006) 
 
CASH COMP. INCENT. (MARKET)                        0.0635*** 
t-stat (4.99) 
CASH COMP. INCENT. (FIRM) -0.00031 
t-stat (1.19) 
  
 
Percentage Effect124   40.0% 
  -10.9% 
Observations  231 
Adjusted R-squared  43.3% 
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can be excluded as an explanation of the effects on Bank Risk shown in those Tables.127  
Importantly, this confirms our claim that changes in executive pay had limited effect on 
changes in non-executive risk-taking.  Greater homogeneity in the financial markets128 
caused non-executive pay to no longer be a choice made by a bank’s top executives, but 
instead increasingly to be determined by the market’s demand for talent.129 
C. Non-Executive Incentives and Bank Value  
So far we have considered the impact of bank non-executive incentives on risk-
taking without analyzing whether they were efficient or inefficient.  Bank compensation 
that promotes riskier strategies is not necessarily inefficient,130 for example, if it is associ-
ated with a high (long-term) expected return.131  Our claim, however, is that the negative 
externality that results from the competition for bank talent caused bank non-executive 
incentives to be inefficient.132  Greater employee mobility limited the banks’ ability to 
structure non-executive incentives to efficiently manage a banker’s effort choices 
(inducing her to refrain from self-interested conduct) and risk choices (inducing her to 
undertake an optimal level of risk).133  
 
Empirically, our claim can be tested by relating bank non-executive incentives 
before the financial crisis (2003-2006) to Bank Value, measured as the bank’s average 
                                                                                                                                                 
banks with more deposit-funding may be more prone to taking excessive risk.  Control (iv) is included, 
because banks that are less well-capitalized tend to be more exposed to insolvency and, therefore, more 
sensitive to changes in risk.  Finally, controls (v)-(x) are included since the indicated lines of business may 
directly impact future bank risk and value.  See Acharya et al., Non-Executive Incentives, supra note 12, 
app. at Table 1. 
127
 Executive incentives were measured through CEO Delta, which estimates the sensitivity of CEO 
compensation to stock price (i.e., the percent change in the value of the CEO option portfolio for a one 
percent increase in stock price), and CEO Vega, which estimates the sensitivity of CEO compensation to 
stock return volatility (i.e., the percent change in the value of the CEO option portfolio for a one percent 
increase in the volatility of the returns on the underlying stock).  See John Core & Wayne Guay, Estimating 
the Value of Employee Stock Option Portfolios and Their Sensitivities to Price and Volatility, 40 J. ACCT. 
RES. 613, 629 (2002). 
128
 See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text. 
129
 See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text. 
130
 In fact, the main concern with managerial risk choices has long been that undiversified managers 
may have incentives to select projects that are too conservatives from the shareholders’ perspective. 
REBECCA S. DEMSETZ ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., AGENCY PROBLEMS AND RISK TAKING AT 
BANKS 1-2 (1997), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/research_papers/ 
9709.pdf (“[T]he owner/manager agency problem is characterized by excessively safe behavior on the part 
of the manager, who pursues his own objectives at the expense of better diversified shareholders.” 
(emphasis in original)). Conservative projects have the opposite effect of increased risk-taking, 
expropriating wealth from diversified shareholders to the benefit of fixed claimants, including wage-
compensated managers. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 37, at 353. 
131
 Within modern scholarship, the link between risk and expected return was first studied by William 
F. Sharpe.  See William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Condi-
tions of Risk, 19 J. FIN. 425 (1964).  
132
 See supra notes 83-84, 96 and accompanying text. 
133
 See supra notes 100-101 and accompanying text. 
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Tobin’s Q (the ratio of the bank’s market value of assets over its book value of assets)134 
during the financial crisis (2007-2009).  Again, the empirical evidence confirms our 
explanation.  Table 4 shows that bank employee compensation had a negative effect on 
Bank Value, suggesting that the risk-taking that resulted from pre-crisis non-executive 
incentives was inefficient and, hence, so were the incentives.135 
  
                                                 
134
 Tobin’s Q is the ratio of a firm’s market value (defined as the firm’s total liabilities, minus its 
deferred taxes and investment tax credits, plus the value of its preferred stock and the market value of its 
common stock) divided by the replacement cost of its assets.  See Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, 
Testing Trade-off and Pecking Order Predictions About Dividends and Debt, 15 REV. FIN. STUD. 1, 8 
(2002).  The measure was introduced by James Tobin in A General Equilibrium Approach to Monetary 
Theory, 1 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 15 (1969).  Tobin’s Q has become a commonly recognized proxy 
for market valuation.  See, e.g., Philip G. Berger & Eli Ofek, Diversification’s Effect on Firm Value, 37 J. 
FIN. ECON. 39, 40, 47 (1995); Larry H. P. Lang & René Stulz, Tobin’s Q, Corporate Diversification, and 
Firm Performance, 102 J. POL. ECON. 1248, 1249-50 (1994); Randal Morck et al., Management Ownership 
and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 293, 294 (1988); David Yermack, Higher 
Market Valuation of Companies with a Small Board of Directors, 40 J. FIN. ECON. 185, 186 (1996).  One 
major advantage of Tobin’s Q is its computational simplicity.  All of its determinants are retrievable from 
existing data sources such as, for example, the Compustat database.  Tobin’s Q, however, is not without its 
critics.  First, market value may not reflect the marginal cost of capital, but instead may reflect the average 
cost of capital.  In that case, firm value may not be properly captured by Tobin’s Q.  See Joao Gomes, 
Financing Investment, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1263, 1264-65 (2001); see also Eric B. Lindenberg & Stephen 
A. Ross, Tobin’s q Ratio and Industrial Organization, 54 J. BUS. 1, 8-9 (1981).  Second, Tobin’s Q may 
not reflect an accurate valuation of the firm due to market irrationality.  Irrationality could be significant if 
investor sentiment drives valuations in the stock market.  See Malcolm Baker et al., When Does the Market 
Matter? Stock Prices and the Investment of Equity-Dependent Firms, 23 Q. J. ECON. 969, 969-70 (2003).  
With those caveats in mind, Tobin’s Q is still a commonly accepted measure of firm valuation, including 
within the scholarship on corporate governance.  See, e.g., Paul Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and 
Equity Prices, 118 Q. J. ECON. 107, 126 (2003) (“Our valuation measure is Tobin’s Q, which has been used 
for this purpose in corporate-governance studies.”). 
135
 Like the Bank Risk regressions in Tables 2 and 3, all of the Bank Value regressions in Table 4 
include several control variables, including executive incentives and the additional variables specified 
supra in note 126.  The results remained unchanged when the controls were included.  See Acharya et al., 
Non-Executive Incentives, supra note 12, app. at Table 11. 
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Table 4.  Bank Value and Compensation Incentives136 
 
  
 
Bank Value (2007-2009) 
Independent Variables (2003-2006) (1) (2) (3) 
CASH COMP. INCENT.  -0.095***   
t-stat (4.52)   
STOCK COMP. INCENT.  0.0036***   
t-stat (3.46)   
TOTAL COMP. INCENT.   -0.0873***  
t-stat  (10.91)  
CASH COMP. INCENT. (MARKET)   -0.1024** 
t-stat   (3.37) 
CASH COMP. INCENT. (FIRM)   0.0008 
t-stat   (0.69) 
Percentage Effect137  -14.4% -12.8% -16.6% 
  
8.0%  7.2% 
Observations 231 231 231 
Adjusted R-squared 57.3% 57.0% 58.0% 
 
In particular, column 2 shows that total non-executive compensation (TOTAL 
COMP. INCENT.) had a statistically significant negative effect on Bank Value, accounting 
for an average reduction of 12.8 percent during the financial crisis.  That effect increased 
when considering only the cash component of non-executive pay, with CASH COMP. 
INCENT. (shown in column 1) accounting for an average reduction in value of 14.4 
percent during the financial crisis.  By contrast, the stock component of non-executive 
pay, STOCK COMP. INCENT. (also shown in column 1), had a statistically significant 
positive impact on Bank Value, accounting for an average increase of eight percent 
during the financial crisis.  This result is consistent with our claim that stock compensa-
tion is more likely to internalize the negative effect of excessive risk-taking.138  Neverthe-
less, as we observed earlier, stock compensation accounted on average for only two 
percent of total non-executive pay, explaining why the overall effect on Bank Value was 
negative, driven largely by non-executive cash compensation.139  This also explains the 
lower effect of TOTAL COMP. INCENT. on Bank Value, compared to CASH COMP. INCENT., 
since total non-executive compensation included the marginal effect of stock compen-
sation.  
                                                 
136
 The *** , **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  See supra note 
116. 
137
 The percentage effects correspond to a one standard deviation increase in the dependent variable 
(Bank Value) given a one standard deviation increase in the independent variables (the measures of non-
executive incentives).  See Acharya et al., Non-Executive Incentives, supra note 12, at 27 (including a 
detailed discussion of the computations underlying the calculation of the percentage effects). 
138
 See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
139
 See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
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Finally, column 3 shows the effect on Bank Value of the market and firm-specific 
components of cash compensation.  Similar to our prior results,140 the effect of CASH 
COMP. INCENT. (MARKET) on Bank Value dominated CASH COMP. INCENT. (FIRM).  Speci-
fically, CASH COMP. INCENT. (MARKET) had a statistically significant negative effect on 
Bank Value, being responsible on average for a drop in value of 16.6 percent during the 
financial crisis, while the effect of CASH COMP. INCENT. (FIRM) on Bank Value was 
statistically insignificant.   
 
*     *     * 
 
The empirical results in this Part confirm our claim that, in a competitive labor 
market, it is difficult for any one bank employer to implement pay incentives that can 
adjust for risk-taking and long-term outcomes.141  Specifically, we demonstrate the 
following: 
 
(i) Market factors were primarily responsible for setting bank non-executive 
incentives that largely focused on short-term performance.142 
 
(ii) Those incentives promoted employee strategies that increased Bank Risk prior 
to the financial crisis.143  
 
(iii) Increasing Bank Risk was inefficient, causing a significant decline in Bank 
Value during the financial crisis.144   
 
As a result, competitive payoffs rose as each bank sought to hire the same talent, 
reinforcing an industry-wide increase in compensation.145  Underlying the run-up was an 
informational and a coordination problem.  The informational problem arose from each 
bank’s inability to assess the employees’ risk-adjusted results in the short-term.146  The 
coordination problem arose from each bank’s natural interest in hiring the same non-exe-
cutives—in the process, rewarding employees who enhanced short-term performance at 
the expense of riskier strategies and longer-term losses.147  Both problems can benefit 
from regulatory change, and in the next Part, we consider three proposals that respond to 
the problems identified in this Article. 
 
  
                                                 
140
 See supra notes 112, 122-125 and accompanying text. 
141
 See supra notes 83-84, 96 and accompanying text. 
142
 See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
143
 See supra notes 116-120, 125 and accompanying text. 
144
 See supra notes 135-139 and accompanying text. 
145
 See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text. 
146
 See supra notes 81-82, 95 and accompanying text. 
147
 See supra notes 83-84, 96 and accompanying text. 
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III.   REGULATING THE COMPETITION FOR TALENT 
  
In this Part, we propose three regulatory changes to address problems that can 
arise from competition’s effects on compensation.  The prudential regulation of banks 
reflects their importance as financial intermediaries and the costs of a banking crisis—
particularly the negative externalities that can arise from bank risk-taking.148  Much of 
financial regulation induces banks to internalize those costs, reducing externalities by 
restricting the amounts and types of risk a bank can bear.149  In general, it does so by 
circumscribing a bank’s investment assets and capital structure150 and through rules 
regarding net worth, capital, and surplus that effectively cap risk-taking activities.151  
Together, they moderate risk by regulating the asset and liability sides of a bank’s 
balance sheet.152 
   
Those rules also affect bank profitability and employee compensation.153  What 
they fail to do is directly address the incentives of non-executives who actually incur risk.  
The focus instead has been on regulating executives, as the bank’s top decision-
makers.154  The presumption that, by regulating executive pay, each bank’s managers will 
appropriately set non-executive incentives is consistent with an approach to regulation 
that, to date, largely considers each bank separately.155  At odds with that approach is the 
                                                 
148
 A standard example of a negative externality in the banking industry is a bank run that arises from a 
bank’s decision to assume a risky loan portfolio.  Concerns over the bank’s financial stability may become 
substantial, causing depositors to run on the bank to withdraw funds.  See Douglas W. Diamond & Philip 
H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401 (1983) (providing a seminal 
model on financial intermediation and bank runs).  In addition to affecting the bank, and its managers, 
shareholders, and customers, other banks may experience a decline in business, or even a run, as concerns 
over financial stability spread across the financial markets.  Borrowers, as a result, may not be able to 
obtain funding at the same cost, restricting their ability to invest in new, value-enhancing projects and 
causing a slowdown in the general economy.  See Ben S. Bernanke, Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial 
Crisis in the Propagation of the Great Depression, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 257, 264-65, 271 (1983); Charles 
W. Calomiris, Is Deposit Insurance Necessary? A Historical Perspective, 50 J. ECON. HIST. 283, 284 
(1990). 
149
 See Robert Charles Clark, The Soundness of Financial Intermediaries, 86 YALE L.J. 1, 15-18, 23-24 
(1976); Jackson, supra note 57, at 352-59; Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Bank Failures, Risk 
Monitoring, and the Market for Bank Control, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1153, 1155, 1165 (1988). 
150
 See Charles K. Whitehead, Reframing Financial Regulation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1, 47-48 (2010) 
(providing examples of regulatory limits on investment assets and capital structure). 
151
 See id. at 49-50; see also Charles K. Whitehead, What’s Your Sign?—International Norms, Signals, 
and Compliance, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 695, 721-25 (2006) (detailing international efforts).  
152
 See Clark, supra note 149, at 47. 
153
 See Thanassoulis, supra note 11, at 853.     
154
 See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text. 
155
 See MARKUS K. BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULA-
TION 2-4, 14-15 (2009); ANDREW CROCKETT, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, MARRYING THE MICRO- AND 
MACRO-PRUDENTIAL DIMENSIONS OF FINANCIAL STABILITY 3 (2000), http://www.bis.org/review/ 
rr000921b.pdf (“The quintessential micro-prudential dictum is that ‘financial stability is ensured as long as 
each and every institution is sound.’”).  One of us has questioned whether that approach is outdated in light 
of convergence in the financial markets.  See Charles K. Whitehead, Destructive Coordination, 96 
CORNELL L. REV. 323, 360 (2011) (“Expanding the scope of regulation beyond individual firms . . . can 
help fill gaps in today’s regulatory framework.”). 
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market-wide competition for the best employees.  Higher pay can encourage a non-exe-
cutive to pursue a tail-risk strategy if she can sidestep the long-term consequences by 
switching jobs.156  Lower pay can also encourage tail risk if higher short-term perfor-
mance makes it easier to negotiate a hike in compensation from a new, higher-paying 
employer.157  The result has been a decline in the ability of any one bank to set compen-
sation that efficiently balances performance and risk-taking.158     
 
Of course, regulating executive pay can increase an executive’s interest in moni-
toring (and controlling) non-executive risk-taking.  Doing so, however, may be difficult 
to do in real time as new risks are incurred.  Leeson, Tourre, and Iksil each alleged they 
were supervised by managers who knew (or should have known) about the risks they 
took.159  Employees may also minimize their managers’ ability to supervise their activi-
ties and assess their performance.160  Moreover, supervisors themselves may be interested 
in incurring greater risk to the extent a subordinate’s better performance enhances their 
own compensation.161   
 
The more radical insight is that executives may not be able to set efficient non-
executive pay even when they have the incentive to do so.  Executives may be concerned 
that limits on risk-taking are too tight—restricting an employee’s ability to enhance short-
term compensation and causing the best performers to move elsewhere.  In other words, 
even when—perhaps, precisely when—acting in the bank’s best interests, executives will 
still be trapped into providing risk-prone incentives to non-executives due to the negative 
externality that arises from the competition for talent.162  
                                                 
156
 See supra notes 92-95, 100-101 and accompanying text. 
157
 See Eric Dash, Effort to Rein in Pay on Wall St. Hits New Hurdle, N.Y. TIMES LATE EDITION, Aug. 
10, 2009, at A1 (describing competition for talent among firms subject to “pay czar” oversight and those 
that are not).   
158
 Recall, from Figure 1, that a High Risk Employee who has performed well in the short-term is 
interested in moving firms before losses from her High Risk strategy materialize.  The new employer may 
pay no more in the short-term than the existing employer, but changing jobs permits the High Risk 
Employee to avoid the long-term effects of her strategy and enhance total compensation.  See supra Figure 
1 and accompanying text. 
159
 See U.S. SENATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 14, 52, 66-67 (explaining Bruno Iksil’s role in JPMorgan 
trades); JOHN E. MARTHINSEN, RISK TAKERS: USES AND ABUSES OF FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES 219-22 
(Denise Clinton et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2009).  Compare Complaint at para. 4, SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co, 
No. 1:10-cv-03229 (S.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 16, 2010) (accusing Tourre of being “principally responsible for 
ABACUS”) with Answer of Defendant at para. 4, SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co, No. 1:10-cv-03229 
(S.D.N.Y. filed July 19, 2010) (denying allegations except admitting Tourre “was one of many” employees 
involved in the transaction).  
160
 See supra notes 37-42, 82 and accompanying text. 
161
 The potential for a supervisor to prefer that subordinates adopt high-risk strategies is consistent with 
concerns over moral hazard that can arise within partnerships when performance is measured jointly on the 
basis of team (rather than individual) productivity.  See Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 
BELL J. ECON. 324, 325, 327 (1982). 
162
 The concern is not merely theoretical.  In 2011, Goldman Sachs’ shareholders brought a derivative 
suit against the firm’s directors alleging they had breached their fiduciary duties by, among other things, 
failing to properly analyze and rationally set compensation levels for Goldman Sachs’ employees.  See In re 
The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. Shareholder Litigation, No. 5215-VCG, 2011 WL 4826104, at *5 (Del. 
Ch., Oct. 12, 2011).  In particular, they claimed that because the directors “consistently based compensation 
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New regulation that fails to account for a competitive talent market is incomplete.  
We, therefore, argue for three regulatory changes to plug this gap—first, directing regu-
lators to consider the effect of competition on market-wide levels of compensation; 
second, limiting the ability of non-executives to move from a bank to another financial 
firm; and third, requiring some portion of non-executive pay to include a long-term 
equity component, with subsequent employers being restricted from compensating her for 
any losses she incurs related to her prior work.163 
A.  Assessing Competition and Compensation 
Reflecting change in the financial markets,164 regulators should extend their 
assessment of compensation beyond individual banks to include the effect of competition 
on market-wide levels of pay.  That approach differs from the Compensation Guidance 
adopted by U.S. bank regulators.  The Compensation Guidance requires each bank to 
ensure its incentives appropriately balance risk and financial results.165  Missing from the 
Guidance, however, is an assessment of how the competition for talent affects a bank’s 
short-term incentives.  In order to assess pay, the bank (and its regulators) must also 
consider the effects on risk-taking of the incentives other employers offer.166  Those 
employers are not limited to banks.167  In a converging world, the competition for talent 
extends beyond banks to others who offer similar products and services, including invest-
ment banks and hedge funds.168  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
for the firm’s management on a percentage of net revenue, Goldman’s employees had a motivation to grow 
net revenue at any cost and without regard to risk.”  Id. at *1.  The Delaware Chancery Court dismissed the 
case, observing that “[t]he decision as to how much compensation is appropriate to retain and incentivize 
employees, both individually and in the aggregate, is a core function of a board of directors exercising its 
business judgment.” Id. at *14.  Our analysis supports the suit’s dismissal, but for almost the opposite 
reason—namely, that directors should not be held liable for non-executive compensation practices that are 
largely determined by the market’s demand for talent over which they have only limited control.  
163
 This Article’s principal focus has been on non-executive pay in light of the significant contribution 
of non-executives to risk-taking during 2003-2006 and the resulting decline in bank value in 2007-2009, 
independent of the effects of executive pay.  See supra notes 126-129 and accompanying text.  Of course, 
the failure of executives to properly oversee employees is likely to have contributed to the losses banks 
suffered during the financial crisis.  See supra notes 159-161 and accompanying text.  Efforts to improve 
oversight are not inconsistent with the proposals we make here.  In fact, adapting this Article’s proposals 
for senior managers may help address concerns over their own incentives to properly manage risk.  Our 
point is that the current focus on executive pay, without taking account of the market’s demand for non-
executive talent, is incomplete.  See supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text.         
164
 See supra Part I.A.  
165
 See Compensation Guidance, supra note 6, at 36,398.  See Appendix A for a description of the 
Compensation Guidance’s core principles. 
166
 See supra notes 95, 100-101 and accompanying text.   
167
 Our proposal differs from others who argue that regulating compensation can be limited to banks.  
See, e.g., Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 9, at 285 (“Because regulating executive pay can improve the 
effectiveness of banking regulation in achieving its widely accepted goals, it could be appropriate to 
constrain banks’ freedom to set pay structures while not imposing such constraints outside the banking 
sector.”). 
168
 See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text. 
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The need to match what others pay is well-known to bank executives.169  It may, 
however, be difficult for banks to fully assess the compensation arrangements of others.  
Likewise, it may be difficult for regulators who review a bank’s compensation structure 
in isolation to fully assess its risk-taking effects.  For that reason, bank and other financial 
market regulators should be required to coordinate their oversight of compensation.170  
Analyzing compensation in a vacuum fails to reflect the competitive labor market within 
which incentives are assessed by the employees themselves.171 
 
One alternative to monitoring compensation is to impose a compensation cap172 
that limits the amount a firm can pay.  The European Union proposed a pay ceiling, 
although it has not been implemented.173  Compensation caps are intended to minimize 
                                                 
169
 See Tett, supra note 19, at 20; Smith, supra note 82, at W1. 
170
 Coordination among regulators may be facilitated by adoption of the proposed rules appearing in 
Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 76 Fed. Reg. 21,170, 21,172-74 (proposed April 14, 2011) 
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 42 (OCC), at pt. 236 (Fed), at pt. 372 (FDIC), at pt. 563h (OTS), at pts. 741, 
751 (National Credit Union Administration (NCUA)), at 17 C.F.R. pt. 248 (Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC)), at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1232 (Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA)) [hereinafter Jointly 
Proposed Incentive Rules].  Note, however, that those proposed rules would not extend to all financial 
regulators, including the Commodity Futures Trading Commission or state insurance regulators.  A 
summary description of the Jointly Proposed Incentive Rules appears in Appendix A. 
171
 Among its tasks, the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) is charged with identifying risks 
to U.S. financial stability arising from activities in or outside the financial markets.  See Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 112, 12 U.S.C. § 5322 (2012).  The FSOC must “identify 
gaps in regulation that could pose risks to” U.S. financial stability, § 5322(a)(2)(G), as well as make recom-
mendations to primary regulators to “apply new or heightened standards and safeguards for financial 
activities or practices that could create or increase risks” among financial firms and markets, § 
5322(a)(2)(K).  In addition to the Jointly Proposed Incentive Rules, see supra note 170, this broad grant of 
authority offers one basis for financial regulators, under the FSOC’s guidance, to begin assessing the effect 
of greater competition for talent on compensation and risk-taking incentives.   
172
 Here we refer to limits on total compensation, not caps on bonuses or other incentive pay.  A cap on 
incentive pay is likely to result only in the deck chairs being re-arranged from bonuses to increased salary.  
See Daniel Schäfer & Tom Braithwaite, Bankers Look for Ways Round Bonus Caps, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 28, 
2013), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9b8d8f48-81cb-11e2-b050-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2WD359gql.  
Competition’s effect on compensation and risk-taking, described in this Article, would be largely 
unchanged, although the resulting rise in fixed expense could create greater bank instability.  See 
Thanassoulis, supra note 11, at 849-50 (claiming that competition for bank employees generates a negative 
externality by increasing compensation and rival banks’ default risk); Murphy, supra note 77, at 14-15.  
Professor Thanassoulis demonstrates how a modest cap on bonuses set by reference to a bank’s balance 
sheet can lower default risk among larger banks as well as lessen the competition for employees.  See 
Thanassoulis, supra note 11, at 868-69.  His model, however, differs from this Article’s analysis through its 
premise on (i) a population of bankers with publicly observable skills and (ii) bank remuneration and risk 
being internally decided.  See id. at 850.  The model also contemplates continued differences in compen-
sation levels among banks, but does not address the effect of those differences on the risk-taking incentives 
of non-executives.  See id. at 852. 
173
 In February 2013, the European Union (EU) provisionally agreed to limit bankers’ incentive com-
pensation to an amount equal to their fixed salary (a one-to-one ratio) that could be increased to twice their 
fixed salary (a two-to-one ratio) with the approval of a supermajority of shareholders.  Increases in base 
salary, therefore, would raise the total compensation that can be paid in line with the competition for talent.  
The new limit was to be finalized by June 2013, see Murphy, supra note 77, at 1, but is subject to 
continuing review, see EUROPEAN BANKING AUTHORITY, EBA FINAL DRAFT REGULATORY TECHNICAL 
STANDARDS 5 (2013), available at http://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/526386/EBA-RTS-2013-
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 This simplifying assumption differs from proposals to impose a modest cap on compensation based 
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each period to reflect medium Bank Performance—with the result that, as a dollar 
amount, it is higher in the Long-Term than in the Short-Term due to the market-wide 
increase in compensation that arises from the competition for talent (as evidenced by the 
shift in pay from the Original Contract to the New Contract).175  Unlike Figure 1, no 
Employee can receive the highest Employee Payoff at point B in the Short-Term or point 
G in the Long-Term.  Instead, all Employees are capped at point A in the Short-Term 
(under the Original Compensation Cap) and point F in the Long-Term (under the New 
Compensation Cap).   
 
The Compensation Cap may result in a decline in risk-taking under some circum-
stances.  Certainly, a talented Employee who achieves medium-level Bank Performance 
with moderate risk-taking has little incentive to take more risk if her Employee Payoff 
remains unchanged.  Nevertheless, both talented and less-talented Employees may be 
interested in a High Risk strategy if Low Risk is more likely to result in Bank Perfor-
mance and compensation below the Compensation Cap.176  Employees may prefer the 
greater likelihood of Short-Term gains from a High Risk approach so long as they can 
move to a new employer before any losses materialize.  Like in Figure 1, by moving to a 
new employer, a High Risk Employee will be compensated as if she was a talented 
Employee, starting from an Employee Payoff at point E.177  By adopting a High Risk 
strategy at her new employer, the Employee may be able to increase her compensation, 
but now due to the Compensation Cap, rising from point E to point F—overall, still a 
significant increase in compensation compared to what the High Risk Employee other-
wise would have received at point C.  Reaching point F, however, does not require the 
same level of Bank Performance as is required to reach point G.  Consequently, depend-
ing on where the Compensation Cap is set, maximizing compensation may be possible 
with fewer risky transactions or an overall decline in risk-taking.178  In addition, with a 
Compensation Cap, new employers may anticipate that an Employee who selected High 
Risk in the Short-Term is more likely to switch jobs than a talented Employee who does 
                                                                                                                                                 
mance enhances their ability to move to a larger bank with a higher bonus cap.  See supra notes 95, 100-
101 and accompanying text.    
175
 Adjusting the Compensation Cap from the Original Contract to the New Contract, rather than 
setting it at a fixed amount during the short-term and long-term, is consistent with the EU’s proposed 
regulation that ties bonuses to base salary.  See supra note 173 and accompanying text.   
176
 See supra note 102 and accompanying text (discussing potential distortions in the incentives of 
talented and less-talented Low Risk Employees arising from competition).  
177
 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.   
178
 The long-term Compensation Cap could be set at a level lower than depicted in Figure 2, for 
example, at a fixed dollar amount corresponding to the Short-Term Compensation Cap during both the 
Short-Term and Long-Term periods.  Doing so is likely to depress mobility—causing most Employees to 
remain with their original employer over the Long-Term, since transferring to a new employer would be 
less likely to increase total compensation.  The result would be a decline in risk-taking, since less mobile 
Employees would be more likely to realize the negative effects of a High Risk strategy.  Nevertheless, a 
less-talented Employee could still adopt a short-term High Risk strategy if it was necessary to reach a 
medium-level of performance, hoping to then move to a new employer to avoid the resulting consequences. 
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not face the same Long-Term losses.  That separating effect may limit Employee mobility 
or signal to new employers the need to more closely monitor a new hire.179   
 
Balanced against its benefits, the Compensation Cap may also limit Employee 
effort and deter risky strategies that are valuable to the bank.  By capping an Employee’s 
payout, the Compensation Cap can reduce a non-executive’s efforts since her share of 
any returns will be limited.  Assume, for example, that the Employee’s contribution to 
Bank Performance has reached the medium-level (and so her pay is also at the Compen-
sation Cap), and she discovers a new opportunity to enhance Bank Performance further.  
Assume also that the opportunity has a 50 percent chance of yielding an additional $10 
million for the bank and a 50 percent chance of losing $5 million.  Notwithstanding the 
risk of loss, the expected value of the opportunity is positive, $2.5 million ((50% x $10 
million) minus (50% x $5 million)).  Without the Compensation Cap, pursuing the oppor-
tunity would be valuable for both the Employee and the bank.  With the Compensation 
Cap, however, even though the opportunity remains valuable to the bank, the Employee 
has no incentive to pursue it.  Any value that results will accrue to the bank, but any loss 
will reduce the Employee’s compensation.180   
 
The question, then, is whether the potential cost of a Compensation Cap out-
weighs its benefits.  On the one hand, Employees subject to a cap are more likely to exert 
lower effort and give up valuable opportunities compared to Employees in a regime 
without a cap.  On the other hand, a Compensation Cap potentially reduces the negative 
effects of mobility described in this Article.  The key to assessing its benefits is not 
simply to focus on how it affects current pay, but also to consider its effect on an 
Employee’s future opportunities.  Even with a Compensation Cap, excessive risk-taking 
may be a logical strategy for some Employees if it improves Bank Performance, the 
Employee’s payout, and her ability to switch jobs.181 
                                                 
179
 To the extent that switching jobs always results in an increase in the Employee Payoff, one would 
think that a talented Employee with medium performance also has an incentive to move to a competitor.  
However, since that Employee does not fear long-term retribution from her current employer, she is more 
likely to use the threat of leaving to negotiate a Long-Term Employee Payoff under the Original Contract 
falling at point F rather than point D.  Thus, based on the likelihood of a High Risk Employee moving and a 
Low Risk Employee staying, a new employer should theoretically be able to separate Low and High Risk 
hires, taking the Employee’s High Risk strategy into account when deciding whether to hire her and the 
terms of her New Contract.  In practice, however, an Employee can point to a number of non-economic 
reasons for choosing to find a new job.  They include personal factors, work satisfaction, satisfaction with 
supervision, co-workers, promotional opportunities, and organizational commitment.  See John L. Cotton & 
Jeffrey M. Tuttle, Employee Turnover: A Meta-Analysis and Review with Implications for Research, 11 
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 55, 57 (1986); W.H. Mobley et al., Review and Conceptual Analysis of the Employee 
Turnover Process, 86 PSYCHOL. BULL. 493, 496-512 (1979).  As a result, the signal that arises from an 
Employee’s departure could be noisy.  A mandatory garden leave period would help employers identify 
whether a prospective employee’s previous performance was due to excessive risk-taking.  See infra Part 
III.B. 
180
 Although a drop in the Compensation Cap may result in a decline in risk-taking, see supra note 
178, the potential effect on risk-taking that is valuable to the bank is likely to be greater as well.  
181
 Risk-taking incentives may also increase depending on the effect of a Compensation Cap on what 
Employees are paid.  For example, a cap on bonus compensation may result in an increase in fixed salary.  
Since a higher fixed salary increases the amount the Employee will earn, without regard to the results of her 
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A Compensation Cap is not inconsistent with this Article’s proposals, although it 
does not directly address the problems arising from competition.  Whether a Compensa-
tion Cap is effective, we suspect, will vary by bank and from year-to-year and will turn 
on the regulators’ ability to adjust the cap based on the experience and insights they gain 
over time.182  Like our proposal, however, it will also require regulators to coordinate 
across the financial markets to assess the effect of the Compensation Cap on relative 
incentives and mobility. 
B. Limiting Mobility 
At its core, the tension between compensation and competition arises from the 
ability of non-executives to change jobs.  An employee can incur significant risk in order 
to enhance short-term performance, but then switch employers to avoid the consequences 
of that high-risk strategy.183  
 
In response, new regulation should limit the ability of a bank’s non-executives to 
move to another financial employer (including other banks, insurance companies, broker-
dealers, and hedge funds).  Regulation is required because, as noted before,184 no one 
firm has the incentive to unilaterally stop competing for others’ employees and halt com-
petition’s distortive effect on compensation.  New regulation, therefore, should require a 
bank’s non-executive employment contracts to include terms that make continuing 
employment more valuable than outside job opportunities.  A mandatory garden leave185 
would increase the cost of an employee’s departure and, by lengthening the time before 
she starts her new job, permit successor employers to better assess her prior performance.  
Put another way, by requiring a garden leave, regulation may make long-term cooper-
ation with the original employer more rewarding than the gains a non-executive could 
receive by exploiting the competition for talent.186  The new requirement would not be an 
                                                                                                                                                 
risky strategy, she may incur greater risks in light of the potential increase in bonus (subject to the 
Compensation Cap), but without being fully exposed to the potential loss in light of the higher fixed salary.  
See Murphy, supra note 77, at 15-16.   
182
 See Charles K. Whitehead, The Goldilocks Approach:  Financial Risk and Staged Regulation, 97 
CORNELL L. REV. 1267, 1295-99 (2012) (advocating a staged approach to implementing new financial 
regulation that takes account of information regarding its effect on market conduct). 
183
 See supra notes 92-95, 100-101 and accompanying text. 
184
 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.  
185
 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
186
 This approach is grounded economically on relational contracts and repeated trust games.  The 
basic intuition is that, when actors anticipate they will interact more than once, they are more likely to 
consider the effect of their current actions on the future actions of the other actors.  See DREW FUDENBERG 
& JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY 110 (1991) (showing that, in repeated games, players “condition their 
actions on the way their opponents played in previous periods”).  This leads to cooperation so long as each 
actor values continuing the interaction and they can agree upon a credible punishment in the event either of 
them deviates from a cooperative strategy.  See Robert Gibbons & Rebecca Henderson, What Do Managers 
Do?, in THE HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL ECONOMICS 680, 698 (Robert Gibbons & John Roberts eds., 
2013).  
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absolute restriction on changing jobs, but it would increase the cost of departure as one 
means to balance against the employee’s risk-taking incentives.   
 
Our proposal is not as novel as it first seems.  Garden leave policies already are in 
place at some banks,187 often to discourage employees from departing or to limit their use 
of company information at a competitor.  A garden leave requirement, however, should 
only be as broad as necessary to address the effects of competition on bank risk.  To this 
end, it should be limited to non-executives who are responsible for material business lines 
or whose activities may expose the bank to material amounts of risk.188  Exceptions 
should be made for employees who are involuntarily terminated or who leave the bank 
due to an unexpected change of circumstances, including for personal reasons.  Our goal 
is to limit the employee’s incentives to incur risk in the short-term with the expectation of 
then transferring to a new employer.  Relaxing the garden leave requirement when the 
change in job is unanticipated is consistent with that goal.189 
 
The new regulation should also apply only to employees who depart a bank for 
another financial firm, since our focus is on bank risk.  It should not extend to employees 
who move from one non-bank employer to another, from a non-bank to a bank, or 
(presumptively) from a bank to a non-financial firm.190  Banks will still be required to 
offer market-level compensation to attract talent, offsetting any tendency to pay “captive” 
employees unfairly.  Under this new regime, however, employees will be less inclined to 
pursue high-risk strategies, because longer-term employment will make it more likely 
they will face the consequences of their risk-taking.  
 
                                                 
187
 See Howard J. Rubin & Gregg A. Gilman, Will Garden Leaves Blossom in the States?, EMP. REL. L. 
J., Fall 2007, at 3, 3-4.  Bank of America, for example, instituted a garden leave requirement for financial 
advisors within one of its banking businesses, U.S. Trust, but not within Merrill Lynch, although similar 
requirements have been introduced in other investment banks.  See John Aidan Byrne, No Hardball Garden 
Leave at Merrill, Krawcheck Tells Advisors, WEALTH MGMT.COM (Mar. 7, 2011), http://wealthmanage-
ment.com/practice-management/no-hardball-garden-leave-merrill-krawcheck-tells-advisors; Joe Rauch, 
BofA’s US Trust Adding “Garden Leave” for Some, REUTERS (Feb. 18, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2011/02/18/us-bankofamerica-ustrust-idUSTRE71H4OZ20110218. 
188
 That limitation is consistent with the Compensation Guidance, except that the Compensation 
Guidance extends to groups of employees subject to similar incentive compensation arrangements who, in 
aggregate, may expose the bank to material amounts of risk.  See Compensation Guidance, supra note 6, at 
36,413.  This Article’s focus has been on individual employees and, while employee groups may raise 
similar issues, those issues may be more diffuse when no individual is likely to expose the bank to material 
risk.  Absent evidence to the contrary, we would limit the new regulation to individuals.  
189
 We have not recommended a specific garden leave period, expecting regulators to do so after solici-
ting comments from financial market participants and others.  Garden leave periods in the financial 
industry vary today, with examples ranging from 50 to 90 days and potentially beyond, with receipt or 
retention of cash and stock bonus payments in some cases being conditioned on departing employees 
complying with the garden leave requirements.  See Rubin & Gilman, supra note 187, at 7-8.  Advisors in 
Bank of America’s U.S. Trust unit were required to stay at U.S. Trust for 60 days, and avoid soliciting 
clients for eight months, after resigning.  See Byrne, supra note 187.     
190
 A bank employee’s ability to move to a non-financial firm may also be tied to her short-term 
performance at the bank.  In that case, her incentives to incur risk and enhance performance may argue in 
favor of imposing a garden leave requirement. 
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An alternative means to limit mobility is to adopt some form of pigouvian tax, 
such as, for example, a tax on the compensation a bank employee receives from her new 
employer.191  To date, however, efforts to manage conduct and compensation through 
direct taxation have met with limited success.  For example, in response to the takeover 
wave of the 1980s, much of corporate America adopted “golden parachutes” that 
awarded substantial payments to incumbent managers following a change in control of 
their company.  Sections 280(G) and 4999 of the Internal Revenue Code were intended to 
limit golden parachute payments by disallowing corporate deductions and imposing a 20 
percent tax on executives for amounts they received in excess of three times the 
applicable “base amount.”192  Those amendments prompted companies to add a “gross 
up” to payments that were made in order to cover the additional tax (as well as taxes on 
the incremental gross-up amount).193  Imposing a new tax, therefore, caused changes in 
how compensation was structured, but did little to reduce the amount that was paid.  Like 
with a tax, some portion of a garden leave’s cost can be offset by what the new employer 
pays, but we believe there is also a real cost—to the employee and, significantly, to the 
new employer—associated with her being “out of the business” for a substantial period of 
time.  The employee may lose customer and other relationships, become less current on 
market practices, or fall behind business changes that occur while she is away.  Those 
costs may be difficult to assess, potentially limiting her appeal to a prospective employer 
and making any reimbursement less certain.   
 
C. Long-Term Equity Compensation and Cash-Outs 
 
New regulation should require a portion of a non-executive’s pay to consist of 
long-term participation in the bank’s equity.  Tying a portion of pay to bank performance, 
and forfeiting future rewards if the employee moves to another financial firm, will 
                                                 
191
 See Acharya et al., Seeking Alpha, supra note 12, at 39 (“policies that discourage managerial 
mobility—say, taxing managers who switch jobs at a higher rate than loyal ones—can improve 
efficiency.”).   
192
 The “base amount” typically was the executive’s average annualized taxable compensation for the 
prior five years or, if shorter, however long she worked for the company.  See Deficit Reduction Act of 
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 280G, 98 Stat. 494, 585-87; § 4999, 98 Stat. at 587.   
193
 See, e.g., Joy Sabino Mullane, Incidence and Accidents: Regulation of Executive Compensation 
through the Tax Code, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 485, 512-19 & n.117 (2009).  Similar problems arose 
with Internal Revenue Code section 162(m), which provided that annual compensation in excess of $1 
million paid to the CEO and the four other highest paid officers of a public company could not be deducted 
by the company as an ordinary business expense.  See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. 
No. 103-66, sec. 13211, § 162, 107 Stat. 312, 469-471.  The new provision had limited effect on total 
compensation—many firms continued to pay compensation in excess of $1 million—and, in fact, increased 
the use of performance-based pay (such as stock options) which was exempt from section 162(m)’s limit on 
deductibility.  See Meredith R. Conway, Money for Nothing and the Stocks for Free: Taxing Executive 
Compensation, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 383, 396-414 (2008); see also David Schizer, Executives 
and Hedging: The Fragile Legal Foundation of Incentive Compatibility, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 440, 468 
(2000) (noting 162(m) may have been a means to encourage performance compensation rather than a way 
to limit total compensation); Nancy L. Rose & Catherine Wolfram, Regulating Executive Pay: Using the 
Tax Code to Influence CEO Compensation 23 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7842, 
2000), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7842 (suggesting firms near cap may have restrained 
salary increases).   
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provide the non-executive with an incentive to remain with her employer.194  Similar to a 
mandatory garden leave, this will reduce the incentives for excessive risk-taking by 
making it more likely a non-executive will face the long-term consequences of her risk 
choices.  From a theoretical perspective, using compensation tied to long-term economic 
performance as a means to incentivize hard-to-monitor employees has been well-explored 
in the industrial organizational literature.195  As applied to banks, employee ownership, if 
structured for the long-term, could likewise help incentivize optimal risk-taking.  This 
argument finds support in the empirical evidence, described earlier in Part II.B, that 
showed that stock incentives paid to bank non-executives in 2003-2006 were correlated 
with lower bank risk and higher bank value during 2007-2009.196 
                                                 
194
 Of course, the composition of a long-term equity compensation package must also be considered.   
As this Article’s empirical results show, by tying returns to long-term financial performance, equity 
compensation may be able to offset incentives for excessive risk-taking.  See supra note 119 and accom-
panying text.  At the same time, since a stock option holder receives the full benefit of an increase in stock 
price, but does not bear the full cost of a loss, see Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 9, at 263, an excessive 
reliance on equity-based compensation may provide bank managers with an incentive to prefer riskier 
projects at the expense of creditors, including depositors.  See id. at 253, 283-84 (arguing that bank execu-
tive compensation should be tied to a security basket representing “a set percentage of the aggregate value 
of common shares, preferred shares, and all outstanding bonds”); see also Richard A. DeFusco et al., The 
Effect of Executive Stock Option Plans on Stockholders and Bondholders, 45 J. FIN. 617, 618 (1990) (“The 
asymmetric payoffs of call options make it more attractive for managers to undertake risky projects.”).  
Moreover, equity compensation is unlikely to be effective in managing risk if existing employers are forced 
by market competition to guarantee a minimum bonus.  See Smith, supra note 82, at W1 (“At most firms, 
much or most of the bonus is paid in stock, which vests over several years, to reward long-term 
performance.  But the market for talent is competitive and many firms have been compelled to offer 
guaranteed or minimum bonuses to recruit people . . . .”).  Restricted compensation also permits an 
employee—in part, based on her assessment of future compen-sation—to calculate the cost of departing the 
bank against the cost of remaining.  In a competitive market, an employee is likely to discount the value of 
long-term compensation at her current employer if she adopted a high-risk strategy to enhance her short-
term performance.  See supra notes 83-84, 98 and accompanying text.  The challenge, therefore, is to 
design a pay package that balances the risk-reducing and risk-enhancing effects of equity compensation.  
195
 See generally Armen Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic 
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 786-90 (suggesting that employee ownership may incentivize forms 
of peer-monitoring); see also Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Rights and Production 
Functions: An Application to Labor-Managed Firms and Codetermination, 52 J. BUS. 469, 471 (1979) 
(noting that production maximization is partially a function of the “organizational forms” available, which 
are based upon property and contract law); Raymond Russel, Employee Ownership and Employee 
Governance, 6 J. ECON. BEHAVIOR AND ORGANIZATION 217, 228 (1985) (noting that conventional modes 
of organization are inappropriate where “[p]erformance is hard to meter, and [where] differences in labor 
quality are hard to identify and control”).   
196
 See supra note 120 and accompanying text.  These results are consistent with other recent empirical 
studies of the use of employee stock option plans (ESOPs).  In particular, one of the studies documents that 
non-financial firms employing ESOPs to remunerate non-executives exhibit lower enterprise risk relative to 
firms that do not use this form of compensation. See Francesco Bova et al., Non-Executive Employee 
Ownership and Corporate Risk-Taking (Rotman School of Management, Working Paper No. 2297996, 
2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2297996.  The impact of ESOPs on 
employee mobility has also been empirically investigated, with several studies finding that broad-based 
equity ownership helps retain a firm’s employees.  See, e.g., John E. Core & Wayne R. Guay, Stock Option 
Plans for Non-Executive Employees, 61 J. FIN. ECON. 253, 257, 274 (2001); Paul Oyer & Scott Schaefer, 
Why Do Some Firms Give Stock Options to all Employees?: An Empirical Examination of Alternative 
Theories, 76 J. FIN. ECON. 99, 110 (2005). 
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One potential concern is that a bank employee may still choose to increase short-
term risk-taking if the pay package she receives from a new employer offsets the long-
term compensation she foregoes, either by paying cash for the restricted compensation 
“left behind” or substituting the new employer’s own long-term pay package (referred to 
as a “golden handshake”).197  In that case, the non-executive will still have an incentive to 
incur risk if, by doing so, she increases the likelihood of a higher-paying (and offsetting) 
job offer from someone else.198   
 
Some portion of our concern is addressed by our prior proposal to limit bank 
employee mobility.199  By imposing a garden leave, a non-executive is more likely to 
remain with the same bank over the long-term, with the consequences of excessive risk-
taking weighing against incentives to pursue a short-term, high-risk strategy.  Our addi-
tion here is to propose that new employers be restricted from “cashing out” the long-term 
portion of a new hire’s prior compensation when setting a new pay package.  The Com-
pensation Guidance directs banks to assess whether golden handshakes materially 
weaken efforts to constrain risk-taking.200  Since non-bank employers may offer them, it 
notes that bank supervisors should continue efforts to coordinate with other financial 
regulators.201  We believe that new regulation must go further and apply equally to non-
bank financial firms.  Restricting a new employer—whether a bank or a non-bank—from 
offsetting the costs of a risky strategy will reinforce the benefits of compensation that is 
tied to long-term performance.202 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Efforts to control bank risk-taking by regulating executive pay rest on two faulty 
premises—first, that executive pay was the principal driver of bank risk prior to the 2007 
financial crisis, and second, that a bank’s managers can bring non-executives into line by 
                                                 
197
 See Compensation Guidance, supra note 6, at 36,401, 36,410.   
198
 See supra notes 95, 101 and accompanying text. 
199
 See supra Part III.B. 
200
 See Compensation Guidance, supra note 6, at 36,410. 
201
 As the Compensation Guidance states: 
 
Provisions that require a departing employee to forfeit deferred incentive compensation 
payments may . . . weaken the effectiveness of a deferral arrangement if the departing employee is 
able to negotiate a “golden handshake” arrangement with the employee’s new organization.  
Golden handshake provisions present special issues for banking organizations and supervisors . . . 
because it is the action of the employee’s new employer—which may not be a regulated 
institution—that can affect the current employer’s ability to properly align the employee’s interest 
with the organization’s long-term health. . . .  The Agencies will continue to work with banking 
organizations and others to develop appropriate methods for addressing any effect that such 
arrangements may have. . . . 
 
Compensation Guidance, supra note 6, at 36,401. 
202
 As noted earlier, one means to coordinate efforts among bank and non-bank financial regulators is 
to use the FSOC’s authority to identify financial market risks and recommend new regulation.  See supra 
note 171. 
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using incentives to manage risk-taking once executive pay is regulated.  What they miss 
is the effect on compensation of the competition among banks and non-banks to hire non-
executives—with changes in pay in response to the demand for talent creating incentives 
for bank non-executives to incur greater risk.203  
 
In effect, the greater competition for products and services, which benefited 
consumers by enhancing financial market efficiency,204 also increased the cost of main-
taining financial market stability.  Has the trade-off been positive?  The answer is 
unlikely to come from the financial firms themselves.  The greater competition created a 
negative externality:  Each bank’s efforts to hire talent rewarded riskier strategies without 
accounting for the longer-term losses that could result.205  In this Article, we proposed 
three ways in which regulation could step in—greater coordination across bank and non-
bank regulators,206 a mandatory garden leave,207 and requiring banks to include a long-
term equity component in non-executive pay, with subsequent employers being restricted 
from compensating for any losses an employee incurs related to her prior work.208  Those 
new requirements could be introduced together with, or in lieu of, a compensation cap.209  
 
One regulatory solution we have not explored is forcing financial firms back into 
the traditional business categories in which they operated.210  Doing so would limit the 
competition for products and services and, in turn, lower the competition for non-
executives.  We are wary, however, of such an approach, since it moves against the trend 
toward convergence in the financial markets we have seen over the last five decades.211  
New regulation should reflect the benefits of that convergence, but it must also take 
account of the new costs.   
 
 
APPENDIX A:  COMPENSATION GUIDANCE 
AND JOINTLY PROPOSED INCENTIVE RULES 
 
The Compensation Guidance is a principles-based approach to incentives, without 
mandating or prohibiting any specific forms of compensation or establishing mandatory 
levels or caps.212  It is directed toward senior executives at banks, individuals (including 
non-executives) whose activities may expose a bank to material amounts of risk, and 
groups of employees who are subject to the same or similar incentive compensation and 
who, in aggregate, may expose the bank to material amounts of risk (even if no one 
                                                 
203
 See supra notes 100-101 and accompanying text. 
204
 See Whitehead, supra note 150, at 37-39. 
205
 See supra notes 83-84, 96 and accompanying text. 
206
 See supra Part III.A. 
207
 See supra Part III.B. 
208
 See supra Part III.C. 
209
 We analyze how a compensation cap could work supra at notes 174-182 and accompanying text. 
210
 See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text. 
211
 See supra notes 62-75 and accompanying text. 
212
 See Compensation Guidance, supra note 6, at 36,399.   
  
-42- 
 
person is likely to do so).213  The Compensation Guidance is premised on three core prin-
ciples, namely that (i) incentives should appropriately balance risk and financial results in 
order not to encourage employees to take imprudent risks, (ii) incentives should be 
compatible with effective controls and risk management, and (iii) incentives should be 
supported by strong corporate governance, including board oversight.214  Bank regulators 
have committed to ensure that banks incorporate the Compensation Guidance through a 
process that includes inspections and examinations that will produce a supervisory rating 
that reflects bank compliance.215  That rating will form a part of the Uniform Financial 
Institutions Rating System regime, adopted by the Fed, the OCC, and the FDIC, which 
provides a composite score based on a bank’s capital adequacy, asset quality, manage-
ment, earnings, liquidity, and sensitivity to market risk (known by its acronym, 
“CAMELS”).216  CAMELS is often criticized for failing to identify troubled banks,217 
and so its effectiveness in policing bank activities is open to question.218   
 
Section 956 of the Dodd-Frank Act219 requires the Fed, the OCC, the FDIC, the 
OTS, the NCUA, the SEC, and the FHFA (together, the Agencies) to introduce the 
Jointly Proposed Incentive regarding incentive pay for a much broader range of financial 
institutions.  The proposed rules contain standards that are consistent with the Compen-
sation Guidance.  Specifically, the Agencies would prohibit incentive-based pay to 
executive officers, employees, directors, or principal shareholders that is excessive and 
encourages inappropriate risks or that could lead to material financial loss.220  The new 
rules also would prohibit pay that is unreasonable or disproportionate to the amount, 
nature, quality, and scope of services performed.221  In addition, for larger firms, a 
portion of incentive pay would be deferred for executives, and the board would be 
required to identify and approve incentive pay for non-executives who have the ability to 
expose the firm to substantial losses.222 
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